BENCH: Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice
Manoj Misra
FACTS:
The present appeal arises from a judgment
dated 12th November 2024 passed by the Patna High Court in Criminal
Miscellaneous No. 67884 of 2023, whereby it allowed an application under
Section 482 of the CrPC and quashed an FIR filed by the appellant, Abhishek
Singh. The appellant, a businessman, had availed a gold loan of Rs.7,70,000 from the
Bank of India’s Motijhil Branch on 22nd July 2020, pledging 254 grams of
22-carat gold ornaments as collateral. Upon receiving a demand notice from the
bank dated 7th October 2022, the appellant claimed to
have fully repaid the loan, including interest, by 31st March 2023. However,
the bank conducted a revaluation of the pledged ornaments, charging Rs.1500 for the
process—and refused to return the gold, allegedly declaring it counterfeit. The bank then filed an FIR against the appellant under
Sections 420 and 379 IPC on 22nd May 2023, claiming the pledged gold was fake.
In response, the appellant filed a
complaint under Section 156(3) CrPC, resulting in a second FIR (Mithanpura P.S.
Case No. 393 of 2023) against the Branch and Credit Manager (Respondent No. 1),
alleging criminal breach of trust and cheating. During the ongoing
investigation, the police filed a chargesheet in the appellant’s case. However,
before completion, the respondents sought to quash the FIR, which the High
Court allowed, holding that the FIR was a retaliatory counterblast to the
bank’s earlier complaint. It concluded that the complaint lacked merit, was
filed with ulterior motives, and that even if the allegations were taken at
face value, no offence was disclosed. Citing Priyanka Srivastava v. State of UP,
the High Court also noted the absence of a mandatory affidavit with the Section
156(3) application. Consequently, the FIR was quashed, prompting the appellant
to file the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
The primary issue in this case was whether
the High Court erred in quashing the FIR filed by the appellant under Section
156(3) CrPC, which alleged cheating and criminal breach of trust by bank
officials. The Court had to determine if a prima facie case was made out
against the respondents that warranted investigation and trial, or whether the
FIR was merely a retaliatory counterblast to an earlier FIR lodged by the bank.
Additionally, the case questioned whether the High Court had overstepped its
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC by delving into the merits of the case and
considering evidence beyond the contents of the FIR at the preliminary stage.
JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set
aside the Patna High Court’s order dated 12 November 2024, and restored the FIR
(Mithanpura P.S. Case No.393 of 2023) and related proceedings initiated by the
appellant. It held that the High Court had improperly exercised its
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC by quashing the FIR without properly
considering whether a prima facie case was made out.
The Supreme Court emphasized that at the
stage of quashing a criminal proceeding under Section 482 CrPC, the High
Court's role is limited to examining whether a prima facie offence is made out from
the contents of the FIR and not to embark upon a detailed scrutiny of the
evidence or draw conclusions on the merits. Citing precedents such as Rajeev
Kourav v. Baisahab and Naresh Aneja v. State of U.P., the Court
noted that evidence produced by the accused cannot be relied upon at the
preliminary stage to rebut allegations in the FIR unless exceptional
circumstances exist. The High Court had relied on documents and findings beyond
the FIR to conclude that the appellant acted with mala fide intent and lodged a
false complaint. Such a conclusion, especially regarding the appellant’s
intention, required appreciation of evidence and could not be summarily decided
without trial.
Further, the Supreme Court found that the
High Court had failed to consider relevant factual aspects—such as the full
repayment of the loan before the revaluation and seizure of the pledged gold,
the absence of any third-party verification during revaluation, and the
unexplained removal of the first valuer. These factors raised serious doubts
regarding the bank's handling of the pledged gold, and whether misappropriation
or fraudulent conduct occurred post-loan repayment could only be established
after a full trial. As the gold remained in the bank’s custody throughout, any
allegations of fraud or tampering could not be conclusively dismissed without
recording evidence. The FIR thus disclosed the commission of cognizable
offences, and the High Court had prematurely quashed it, defeating the criminal
justice process. Accordingly, the Court reinstated the FIR for due
investigation and trial.
ANALYSIS:
The Supreme Court’s analysis in this case
underscored the limited scope of judicial intervention at the stage of quashing
a criminal proceeding under Section 482 of the CrPC. It emphasized that the
High Court’s role is confined to determining whether a prima facie offence is
disclosed on the face of the FIR, without delving into a detailed examination
of evidence or making findings on the merits of the allegations. The Court
highlighted that the High Court erred in relying on documents and conclusions beyond
the FIR to assert that the appellant acted with mala fide intent and filed a
frivolous complaint. Since questions of intent and credibility require a full
appreciation of evidence, such determinations cannot be made summarily at the
quashing stage. The Supreme Court referred to established precedents to
reinforce that the accused’s defense cannot be examined at this preliminary
juncture unless exceptional circumstances exist.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court pointed out
several critical factual discrepancies that the High Court failed to consider,
such as the appellant’s full repayment of the loan before the revaluation and
withholding of the pledged gold, the absence of independent third-party
verification during the revaluation process, and the suspicious removal of the
first valuer. These facts raised serious concerns about the bank’s conduct and
the possibility of misappropriation or fraud related to the gold held in its custody.
Since the appellant had no access to the gold post-pledge, allegations of
tampering or fraudulent valuation could only be conclusively addressed after a
trial with evidence led by both parties. Therefore, the FIR clearly disclosed
cognizable offences, and the High Court’s premature quashing hindered the
proper administration of justice. The Supreme Court restored the FIR and
directed that the matter proceed to investigation and trial, leaving the
question of guilt or innocence to be determined on merits.