ADS SPIRITS PVT. LTD. V. THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS 2026:DHC:5783:

DATE: 21.07.2026

COURT: High Court of Delhi

BENCH: Justice Jyoti Singh

FACTS:

The Appellant, part of the ADS Group of Companies (a major Indian liquor conglomerate incorporated in 2010 with over ₹7,500 crores in sales by March 2025 and brands such as Royal Green Whisky), filed Trade Mark Application No. 5514779 on 03.07.2022 for registration of the word mark “OFFER” in Class 33 for “alcoholic beverages, except beers; alcoholic preparations for making beverages” on a proposed-to-be-used basis. The Appellant claimed the mark was arbitrary, inherently distinctive, and an honest adoption capable of distinguishing its goods.

The Registrar of Trade Marks (Respondent) issued an Examination Report dated 18.11.2022 objecting under Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, on the ground that the mark was a common surname/personal name/geographical name/ornamental or non-distinctive figure. After replies (including lists of prior registered marks containing “OFFER” and citations such as Abu Dhabi Global Market), hearings, and an additional reply, the Respondent rejected the application by order dated 30.10.2025, holding that “OFFER” is used in common parlance for demanding discounts and is therefore devoid of uniqueness. The Appellant challenged this order under Section 91 of the Act.

ISSUES:

Whether the impugned order dated 30.10.2025 refusing registration of the mark “OFFER” under Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, is sustainable in law, particularly whether the mark is devoid of distinctive character in relation to alcoholic beverages in Class 33, whether the Registrar applied the correct legal test, and whether the order is non-speaking and suffers from non-application of mind.

JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:

The Delhi High Court quashed and set aside the impugned order dated 30.10.2025 and directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to reconsider Application No. 5514779 afresh within four months, after granting the Appellant a hearing and considering all replies and documents on record, without expressing any opinion on the merits of registrability.

The Court held that the impugned order is wholly non-speaking, unreasoned, and cryptic. It failed to address any of the Appellant’s submissions in the replies to the Examination Report and hearing notices, including the list of 31 previously registered marks containing the word “OFFER” (with or without prefixes/suffixes) and the binding precedent in Abu Dhabi Global Market v. Registrar of Trademarks. As a quasi-judicial authority, the Registrar is obliged to consider all material, submissions, and relevant case law and to pass a speaking order reflecting application of mind. Stereotyped or cryptic rejection orders that ignore the response defeat the very purpose of issuing an Examination Report and calling for a reply; such orders are unsustainable in law, as consistently held by this Court and the Bombay High Court in cases such as I Am the Ocean, LLC, Psychotropic India Limited, and Cargill Incorporated.

Further, the Registrar applied an entirely wrong test. Section 9(1)(a) prohibits registration only of marks that are “devoid of any distinctive character, that is to say, not capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one person from those of another person.” The provision does not require the mark to be “unique.” Distinctiveness must be assessed relative to the specific goods (here, alcoholic beverages). A common English word may be arbitrary and inherently distinctive when it has no direct connection with the goods in question (as illustrated by authorities such as Mohd. Rafiq, Oswaal Books, Evergreen Sweet House, Mankind Pharma, and Disruptive Health Solutions). The Registrar never examined whether “OFFER” functions as a source identifier for liquor; instead, it relied on a misplaced notion of uniqueness and a superficial view that the word denotes a discount. Offer and discount are not synonymous, and the word is not ordinarily used as a standalone promotional slogan on alcoholic beverages. The authorities cited by the Respondent (Venus Worldwide, IHHR Hospitality, Pernod Ricard) were distinguishable because those marks were either generic within the relevant trade or required proof of secondary meaning criteria never properly applied here. Consequently, a fresh consideration under the correct statutory parameters is necessary.

ANALYSIS:

This decision underscores a fundamental procedural and substantive safeguard in Indian trademark law: the Registrar of Trade Marks, as a quasi-judicial authority, cannot issue stereotyped or cryptic refusals under Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. By quashing the order for its complete failure to engage with the applicant’s replies, prior registrations containing the word “OFFER,” and binding precedents such as Abu Dhabi Global Market, the Court reaffirms that an opportunity to respond to an Examination Report is meaningless unless the authority demonstrates actual application of mind through a speaking order. The ruling aligns with a consistent line of Delhi and Bombay High Court authority that treats non-reasoned rejections as an abdication of statutory duty, thereby protecting applicants from arbitrary administrative action.

On the merits of distinctiveness, the judgment correctly insists that Section 9(1)(a) does not demand “uniqueness” but only the capacity of the mark to distinguish the applicant’s goods from those of others, assessed relative to the specific goods in question. A common English word such as “OFFER” may be arbitrary and inherently distinctive for alcoholic beverages if it has no direct descriptive or promotional connection with liquor, a principle drawn from cases involving marks like “SUN” for lanterns, “ONE FOR ALL” for books, and “DON’T WORRY” for cosmetics. By remanding the matter for fresh consideration under the proper legal test without expressing any view on registrability, the Court preserves the statutory spectrum of distinctiveness (arbitrary/fanciful → suggestive → descriptive → generic) while preventing the Registrar from conflating everyday language with non-distinctiveness. The decision thus serves both as a corrective to mechanical examination practices and as a reminder that context-specific analysis remains central to absolute grounds of refusal.