BAR COUNCIL OF GOA AND MAHARASHTRA VS RAJIV NARESHCHANDRA NARULA & ORS 2025 INSC 1147:

DATE: 24/09/2025

COURT: Supreme Court of India

BENCH: Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta

FACTS:

The first dispute originated from a complaint filed by Khimji Devji Parmar before the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa (BCMG) against advocate Rajiv Narula, alleging professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. Parmar claimed inheritance rights through his late father, who was a partner in M/s Volga Enterprises. He alleged that during litigation over certain land, consent terms were fraudulently entered into without the knowledge of his father’s partner, and that the respondent-advocate suppressed material facts, thereby depriving him and other heirs of their legitimate rights. Acting on the complaint, the Judge-Advocate of BCMG referred the matter to the Disciplinary Committee without recording detailed reasons.

In the second dispute, a complaint was filed by Bansidhar Annaji Bhakad against advocate Geeta Ramanugrah Shastri, alleging misconduct in connection with a chamber summons filed in his civil suit. Bhakad alleged that the advocate, by identifying the deponent of an affidavit attached to the summons, assumed responsibility for the false statements contained therein, amounting to perjury and fraud. The High Court quashed the complaint as baseless, holding that merely identifying a deponent does not make an advocate privy to the contents of the affidavit. Both matters ultimately reached the Supreme Court after BCMG orders were challenged.

ISSUES:

The issues before the Supreme Court were whether the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa had validly referred the complaints of alleged misconduct against the two advocates to the Disciplinary Committee without recording proper satisfaction under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, and whether the allegations in the complaints disclosed any prima facie case of misconduct or were frivolous and malicious in nature.

JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:

The Supreme Court quashed both disciplinary proceedings, holding that the complaints were frivolous, baseless, and improperly referred to the Disciplinary Committee without compliance with Section 35. It restored the advocates’ professional standing, dismissed the complaints, and imposed costs of Rs. 50,000 each on the complainants and the BCMG, to be paid to the respective advocates for the harassment caused.

The Court reasoned that under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, a State Bar Council must first apply its mind and record reasons showing a prima facie belief that an advocate has committed misconduct before referring the matter to the Disciplinary Committee. Such satisfaction is a mandatory safeguard because referral itself can tarnish an advocate’s reputation and disrupt their professional career. In the first case, the Judge-Advocate’s order was found to be wholly cryptic, lacking even a minimal discussion of the allegations. This non-application of mind rendered the referral illegal and contrary to the statutory scheme. The Court stressed that casual referrals of complaints, especially those rooted in speculative or conjectural claims, undermine the dignity of the profession and subject advocates to unnecessary harassment.

In the second case, the Court endorsed the High Court’s view that identifying a deponent in an affidavit is a ministerial act, not an assumption of responsibility for the truth of its contents. Holding an advocate liable for perjury or forgery merely on the basis of attestation would be absurd and untenable. The complaint was seen as maliciously motivated by a litigant against the opposite party’s advocate, and BCMG’s referral of such a frivolous complaint amounted to abuse of process. The Court characterized the proceedings as bordering on perversity and condemned the conduct of both the complainants and the State Bar Council for causing “immeasurable grief and harassment” to the advocates. By imposing costs, the Court sought to deter misuse of disciplinary mechanisms and reinforce that disciplinary jurisdiction should be exercised only on genuine and substantiated allegations of misconduct.

ANALYSIS:

This judgment reinforces the Supreme Court’s protective stance towards advocates against frivolous and malicious complaints that misuse the disciplinary framework. By clarifying that State Bar Councils must record a reasoned satisfaction under Section 35 of the Advocates Act before referring matters to the Disciplinary Committee, the Court underscored that such referrals cannot be mechanical or casual. Since even a referral can cause significant damage to an advocate’s professional standing and reputation, the Court stressed the need for a careful prima facie assessment to filter out speculative or vexatious allegations. This approach strengthens procedural safeguards for advocates and helps ensure that disciplinary jurisdiction is invoked only in genuine cases of misconduct.

At the same time, the decision highlights the judiciary’s disapproval of litigants who weaponize complaints against opposing counsel as a litigation tactic. By treating the second complaint as malicious and baseless, and imposing costs not just on the complainants but also on the Bar Council for its negligence, the Court sent a strong message that disciplinary mechanisms cannot be allowed to degenerate into instruments of harassment. This judgment therefore strikes a balance between protecting the integrity of the legal profession and preserving advocates’ independence, while also reminding Bar Councils of their responsibility to exercise their statutory powers with diligence, fairness, and accountability.