BRUNDABAN NAYAK VS. ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA & ANOTHER (1965) 3 SCR 53:

DATE: 12.02.1965

COURT: Supreme Court of India

BENCH: Chief Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, and Justices M. Hidayatullah, Raghubar Dayal, S.M. Sikri, and V. Ramaswami.

FACTS:

Brundaban Nayak was elected as a member of the Orissa Legislative Assembly from the Hinjili Constituency in Ganjam district during the 1961 general elections and was later appointed as one of the Ministers in the Council of Ministers of the State of Orissa. On 18 August 1964, Respondent No. 2, P. Biswal (a private citizen), filed a complaint/application directly before the Governor of Orissa, alleging that Brundaban Nayak had incurred a disqualification subsequent to his election under Article 191(1)(e) of the Constitution read with Section 7 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The complaint contained several specific allegations in support of the claim that Nayak had become disqualified to continue as a member of the Legislative Assembly.

On 10 September 1964, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Orissa forwarded the said complaint to the Election Commission of India under the instructions of the Governor. In the forwarding communication, it was stated that a question had arisen under Article 191(1) as to whether the appellant had become subject to the alleged disqualification, and the Election Commission was requested, in the name of the Governor, to make such enquiries as it deemed fit and to furnish its opinion to enable the Governor to decide the matter under Article 192 of the Constitution. Pursuant to this reference, the Election Commission issued a notice to Brundaban Nayak calling upon him to participate in the enquiry into the complaint. Aggrieved by the initiation of the enquiry by the Election Commission, Brundaban Nayak challenged its jurisdiction and filed a writ petition under Article 226 before the Orissa High Court seeking to quash the proceedings. The High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine. Brundaban Nayak then approached the Supreme Court of India by way of a civil appeal by special leave against the order of the Orissa High Court.

ISSUES:

The primary issues presented before the Supreme Court were whether a question as to the disqualification of a sitting member of the Legislative Assembly under Article 191(1)(e) read with Section 7 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, could arise and be referred to the Governor under Article 192(1) on the basis of a complaint filed by an ordinary citizen (Respondent No. 2) directly to the Governor, or whether such a question must necessarily be raised on the floor of the Assembly and referred by the Speaker; and whether, under Article 192(2), the Election Commission of India was competent to hold a detailed enquiry into the complaint and furnish its opinion to the Governor, or whether the Governor alone was required to conduct the enquiry himself and then forward the material to the Commission for a formal opinion. Subsidiary questions included whether the procedural lapse in not forwarding the original complaint to the appellant rendered the entire proceedings illegal and whether the Election Commission’s role under Article 192(2) was merely advisory or decisive.

JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:

The Supreme Court dismissed the civil appeal filed by Brundaban Nayak, upheld the order of the Orissa High Court dismissing the writ petition in limine, and held that the Election Commission of India was fully competent to conduct the enquiry under Article 192(2) of the Constitution and to give its opinion to the Governor. The Court ruled that a question under Article 192(1) can validly arise from a citizen’s complaint to the Governor, who is then bound to refer it to the Election Commission; the Governor’s decision on disqualification is final but must be given strictly in accordance with the Commission’s opinion, which is decisive in substance. There was no order as to costs.

The reasoning of the Court centred on a plain and literal interpretation of Article 192. The Bench observed that Article 192(1) merely requires that “any question arises” as to whether a member has become subject to any disqualification mentioned in Article 191(1); it does not prescribe any particular mode, authority, or forum in which the question must be raised. The words “the question shall be referred for the decision of the Governor” impose no obligation that the question must originate on the floor of the Assembly or be referred by the Speaker; had the framers intended such a restrictive procedure, they would have expressly said so. The constitutional object is to ensure that a person who has incurred a disqualification after election does not continue to sit as a member (in view of the automatic vacancy under Article 190(3)), and allowing a citizen to bring the matter to the Governor’s notice serves the public interest of the constituency. The Governor’s role is not inquisitorial; he is required only to obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and act according to it. The enquiry contemplated by Article 192(2) is therefore to be held by the Election Commission itself, which is the expert constitutional authority in electoral matters. The Court noted that this scheme is consistent with the parallel provision in Article 103(2) for Parliament and with the long-standing practice followed by the Election Commission.

The Court further explained that the Election Commission’s opinion under Article 192(2) is not merely advisory but decisive; the Governor is bound to act in accordance with it and has no discretion to differ. This division of functions, reference by the Governor and enquiry plus opinion by the Commission prevents any concentration of power in the hands of the Governor (who acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers) and ensures impartiality and expedition. The Bench rejected the contention that the Governor must first hold a prima-facie enquiry or that the absence of formal forwarding of the complaint vitiated the proceedings, holding that the appellant was fully aware of the enquiry and had participated in it. Any procedural irregularity of that nature was immaterial once the Commission had assumed jurisdiction under the constitutional provision. The Court emphasised that the entire machinery of Article 192 is designed to resolve disqualification questions speedily and authoritatively, and the appellant’s challenge was essentially an attempt to delay the process. In conclusion, the Bench recommended that Parliament consider conferring statutory powers of inquiry (such as those under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952) on the Election Commission to enable it to effectively discharge its constitutional duty under Article 192(2).

ANALYSIS:

The Brundaban Nayak v. Election Commission of India ((1965) 3 SCR 53) is a significant Constitution Bench judgment that clarified the procedural framework for adjudicating post-election disqualifications of sitting members of State Legislatures under Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that a question regarding disqualification can validly arise not only on the floor of the Legislative Assembly but also through a complaint filed directly by any ordinary citizen or voter to the Governor. Once such a question arises, the Governor is duty-bound to refer it to the Election Commission of India under Article 192(1). The Court further ruled that the Election Commission is fully competent under Article 192(2) to conduct a detailed enquiry into the allegations and furnish its opinion to the Governor, who is then required to act strictly in accordance with that opinion. This decision rejected the narrow contention that disqualification questions must originate only through the Speaker or that the Governor himself must conduct the enquiry before forwarding material to the Commission.

This ruling strengthened the role of the Election Commission as the expert constitutional authority in electoral matters while preventing undue concentration of power in the hands of the Governor (who acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers). By emphasising that the Commission’s opinion is decisive in substance, the judgment ensures impartiality, expedition, and protection of public interest in ensuring that disqualified members do not continue to occupy legislative seats in view of the automatic vacancy under Article 190(3). The decision has been consistently followed in subsequent cases involving disqualification of legislators and remains a key precedent in Indian election law, reinforcing the self-contained constitutional mechanism for resolving post-election disqualifications without allowing parallel or dilatory proceedings. It also highlighted the need for Parliament to equip the Election Commission with adequate statutory powers of inquiry to effectively discharge its constitutional responsibilities under Article 192(2).