DATE: 21/05/2025
COURT: Supreme Court of India
BENCH: Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice
Manoj Misra
FACTS:
On 26.04.2012, the first respondent filed a
complaint against the petitioner and others, who were government servants at
the time, alleging offences under Section 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(2) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. At the time of the alleged offences,
the petitioner was serving as the Chief Minister of Karnataka (from 30.05.2008
to 31.07.2011). Based on an order dated 21.05.2012 under Section 156(3) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, the complaint was referred to the Lokayukta police,
who registered an FIR under provisions of the IPC and the PC Act. After
investigation, a final report was submitted and cognizance was taken on
24.06.2013. The petitioner approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC for
quashing the FIR, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Anil Kumar v. M.K.
Aiyappa, which held that prior sanction is mandatory for initiating
investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC against public servants. The High
Court, agreeing with this view, quashed the FIR and proceedings by an order
dated 11.10.2013, which attained finality.
Despite this, on 12.12.2013, the first
respondent filed a second complaint with nearly identical allegations,
contending that the accused had demitted office and therefore no sanction was
required for prosecution under Section 19 of the PC Act. However, the trial
court dismissed this second complaint on 26.08.2016 for lack of sanction. The
first respondent then filed a fresh petition under Section 482 CrPC before the
High Court, which allowed the petition by its impugned order dated 05.01.2021.
Challenging this, the petitioner filed the present appeal, arguing that: (a)
the second complaint was not maintainable, (b) sanction was still required
under the amended Section 19 and newly introduced Section 17-A of the PC Act,
and (c) the Aiyappa judgment remains binding precedent unless overturned by a
larger bench, making the High Court’s interference unjustified.
ISSUES:
The primary issue presented in this case is
whether the bar under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988—relating to the requirement of prior sanction for prosecution—applies to
the exercise of judicial power under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. Given that this legal question is already under consideration
by a larger bench in Manju Surana vs. Sunil Arora & Ors., and in the
interest of maintaining judicial discipline, the Court has deemed it
appropriate to tag the present petitions with the referred matter and directed
the registry to place them before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for
suitable orders.
JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:
The Supreme Court, while maintaining
judicial discipline, has refrained from adjudicating the issues raised in the
present case, as the core question concerning the applicability of Section 19
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, in the context of a Magistrate’s
power under Section 156(3) CrPC, is already pending before a larger bench in
Manju Surana vs. Sunil Arora & Ors. Consequently, the Court directed that
the present petitions be tagged with the Manju Surana matter and placed before
the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.
The Court carefully considered the
petitioner’s arguments that any alleged act committed in the discharge of
official duties by a public servant would be protected under Section 17A of the
PC Act (as amended in 2018), even if the act occurred before the amendment. It
was also contended that, in light of amended Section 19 of the PC Act and
Section 197 of the CrPC, prior sanction is mandatory for prosecution,
regardless of whether the accused is currently in office. The petitioner also
relied heavily on the decision in Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa, which held that
the absence of prior sanction renders any investigative direction under Section
156(3) CrPC invalid. The petitioner emphasized that until Aiyappa is overruled
by a larger bench, it remains binding law.
On the other hand, the respondents argued
that Aiyappa is in conflict with the earlier three-judge bench decision in R.R.
Chari v. State of U.P., and that sanction is not required at the pre-cognizance
stage under Section 156(3) CrPC. They also maintained that Section 17A does not
apply to court-directed investigations and does not bar the court from ordering
an investigation. In light of these conflicting views and the fact that a
coordinate bench in Shamin Khan v. Debashish Chakrabarty had already tagged a
similar matter with Manju Surana, the Court found it prudent to defer its
decision. Acknowledging the significance and recurring nature of the legal
questions involved, the Court chose not to deliver a verdict on merits and
instead referred the present matter to be heard alongside the pending larger
bench reference for authoritative determination.
ANALYSIS:
This case highlights the legal complexities
surrounding the necessity of prior sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention
of Corruption Act (PC Act), especially in the context of judicial orders under
Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). The petitioner’s reliance
on the Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa ruling underscores a crucial legal protection
afforded to public servants, which mandates prior sanction before initiating
investigation—even through a Magistrate’s directive under Section 156(3). The
petitioner further invoked Section 17A of the PC Act, which imposes
restrictions on investigations into decisions made by public servants in the
discharge of official duties. By contending that these protections apply
irrespective of the accused’s current official status, the petitioner
emphasized the risk of misusing the criminal process without these procedural
safeguards. The fact that the second complaint was based on substantially the
same facts, yet pursued without sanction, raises concerns over judicial
consistency and potential abuse of process.
On the opposing side, the respondents
argued for a narrower interpretation of the requirement of sanction, asserting
that the direction to investigate under Section 156(3) does not amount to
taking cognizance and hence does not trigger the sanction requirement at that
stage. They also challenged the continued reliance on Aiyappa by pointing to
conflicting jurisprudence, especially the earlier and binding precedent in R.R.
Chari v. State of U.P., which supports the permissibility of court-directed
investigations without prior sanction. The divergence in interpretation and the
pending adjudication of this legal issue before a larger bench in Manju Surana
reflects a judicial impasse. By tagging the case with the reference matter, the
Supreme Court took a measured step to uphold judicial discipline and avoid
contradictory rulings. This move acknowledges the frequent recurrence and legal
significance of the issue, signaling the need for authoritative clarity from a
larger bench that could harmonize precedent and settle the law definitively.
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