CHARAN PREET SINGH V. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION CHANDIGARH & ORS 2026 INSC 248:

DATE: 17.03.2026

COURT: Supreme Court of India

BENCH: Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra

FACTS:

The Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh issued an advertisement for recruitment to one post of Law Officer, to be filled solely on the basis of a written test consisting of 100 multiple-choice questions carrying one mark each with 1/4th negative marking for every wrong answer. Both the appellant (Charan Preet Singh) and the third respondent (Amit Kumar Sharma) applied and appeared in the examination. Question No.73 asked: “Which of the following schedule of the Constitution is immune from judicial review on the grounds of violation of fundamental rights?” with options (A) Seventh Schedule, (B) Ninth Schedule, (C) Tenth Schedule and (D) None of the above. The recruiting body treated option (B) as correct and awarded one mark to those who chose it. The third respondent selected option (D) and was awarded no mark; additionally, 1/4th mark was deducted as negative marking, resulting in a total loss of 1.25 marks that materially altered his merit position.

The third respondent filed CWP No.1007 of 2022 before the Punjab and Haryana High Court contending that option (D) was the correct answer in view of the law laid down in I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs v. State of T.N. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on 7.2.2022 holding that the Ninth Schedule continues to enjoy immunity from challenge on the ground of violation of fundamental rights under Article 31B as reinforced by I.R. Coelho. In the intra-court appeal (LPA No.286-2022), the Division Bench by judgment dated 29.5.2025 reversed the Single Judge, held that option (D) was correct because no schedule, including the Ninth, is absolutely immune from judicial review on the ground of violation of fundamental rights, and directed the authorities to revise the third respondent’s score and reconsider his candidature. This direction threatened to displace the appellant who had already been selected and appointed, leading him to file the present Special Leave Petition which was converted into the instant Civil Appeal.

ISSUES:

The core issue was whether option (B) “Ninth Schedule” or option (D) “None of the above” was the correct answer to Question No.73 in the recruitment examination for Law Officer, having regard to the constitutional position on judicial review of laws placed in the Ninth Schedule under Article 31B as interpreted in the line of cases from Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh through Golak Nath, Kesavananda Bharati and culminating in I.R. Coelho, and, if the third respondent’s answer was correct, whether he was entitled to revised marks and appointment at the cost of the already selected appellant.

JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:

The Supreme Court disposed of the Civil Appeal by directing the Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh to create a supernumerary post and appoint the third respondent (Amit Kumar Sharma) as Law Officer as well; upon such appointment the appellant (Charan Preet Singh), who had already joined, would be treated as senior to the third respondent.

The Court observed that when two benches of the High Court itself had reached diametrically opposite conclusions on the correct answer to Question No.73 after elaborate consideration of the constitutional provisions and the authoritative pronouncements of this Court spanning seven decades, it would be wholly unrealistic and unfair to expect a mere law graduate competing in a competitive examination to arrive at the “only correct” answer through nuanced constitutional interpretation. The Single Judge had relied upon the continuing validity of Article 31B and the immunity granted to Ninth Schedule laws against challenges based purely on violation of fundamental rights, while the Division Bench had correctly highlighted that the immunity is not absolute in view of the basic structure doctrine evolved in I.R. Coelho, where laws in the Ninth Schedule remain subject to judicial review if they damage the basic features of the Constitution. Thus, from the standpoint of a candidate who is a law graduate and not a constitutional law expert, both option (B) and option (D) could legitimately be defended as correct answers, though option (B) appeared more aligned with the literal language of Article 31B.

In the second layer of reasoning, the Court emphasised that the 1.25-mark deduction had materially altered the third respondent’s merit and deprived him of fair consideration, yet the appellant had already joined service and could not be ousted after years of litigation. Relying on the precedent in Vikas Pratap Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, the Court held that in such exceptional situations equity demands creation of a supernumerary post so that both meritorious candidates are accommodated without disturbing the existing appointment. This solution balances the constitutional right of the deserving candidate with the principle that delay in judicial determination cannot defeat a vested right, while preserving administrative efficiency and avoiding multiplicity of litigation. The appeal was accordingly disposed of on these equitable terms without entering into a final pronouncement on which of the two options was strictly correct.

ANALYSIS:

This Supreme Court judgment delivered on March 17, 2026, by Justices Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra, exemplifies equitable justice in recruitment disputes where ambiguity in a constitutional law question renders multiple answers defensible. By refusing to declare a single "correct" option for Question No.73, despite the recruiting body's insistence on option (B) "Ninth Schedule" and the Division Bench's endorsement of option (D) "None of the above" the Court acknowledged the profound complexity of Ninth Schedule jurisprudence under Article 31B. It highlighted how even High Court benches diverged after scrutinizing landmark precedents from Shankari Prasad (1951) through Sajjan Singh, Golak Nath, Kesavananda Bharati, to I.R. Coelho (2007), where the immunity from fundamental rights-based challenges persists but is qualified by the basic structure doctrine. The ruling underscores that competitive examinations for law posts cannot reasonably demand expert-level constitutional interpretation from candidates, and penalizing a plausible answer (here, recognizing post-Coelho limits on absolute immunity) would undermine fairness, especially when the mark deduction (1.25 points) decisively altered merit ranking for a single vacancy.

The decision pragmatically resolves the impasse by directing creation of a supernumerary post to accommodate both the appellant (already serving) and the third respondent (Amit Kumar Sharma), with the former retaining seniority. Drawing from Vikas Pratap Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh (2013), the Court prioritized equitable relief over rigid adherence to the original selection, preventing injustice to a deserving candidate due to judicial delays while safeguarding the incumbent's vested rights and administrative continuity. This approach avoids ousting a serving officer after years of litigation, discourages endless disputes over ambiguous MCQs in law-related recruitments, and promotes administrative efficiency by expanding capacity rather than reversing appointments. Overall, the judgment reinforces that constitutional interpretation in examinations must account for legitimate scholarly debate, and equity demands inclusive solutions when merit is not in doubt, setting a balanced precedent for future cases involving nuanced legal questions in public service selections.