DILEEP KUMAR PANDEY V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS 2025 INSC 749:

DATE: 21/05/2025

COURT: Supreme Court of India

BENCH: Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Augustine George Masih

FACTS:

In the lead case, the Appellant contended that following a public advertisement and a selection process conducted by officers of the Indian Air Force (IAF) in July 2005, he was appointed as a Trained Graduate Teacher (TGT) in Physical Education at an IAF-run school. His appointment was initially made on a probationary basis, with the probation period being extended from time to time. However, in June 2007, the Appellant received an official communication informing him that he had been rendered surplus, as the school had decided to appoint a more qualified candidate in his place. He was given two options: either to continue in the school on a contractual basis with a fixed salary or to continue under the existing arrangement, under which his services would automatically terminate on July 3, 2007.

Aggrieved by this development, the Appellant filed a Writ Petition before the High Court, seeking a declaration that he was a confirmed teacher in the school. The Single Judge allowed the Petition, holding that the IAF school qualified as a ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution, thereby subjecting it to constitutional obligations. However, the school management challenged this decision by filing an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench reversed the Single Judge’s ruling, concluding that the school did not fall within the definition of ‘State’ under Article 12. This decision of the Division Bench was then assailed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

The key issues presented in this case revolved around whether an IAF-run school falls within the definition of 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution, thereby making it subject to constitutional scrutiny, and whether the writ petition filed by the appellant challenging his termination was maintainable. The case also examined the nature and purpose of the school’s establishment, particularly its function in serving the educational needs of IAF personnel posted in remote or sensitive locations. Additionally, the Court considered whether the school benefited from privileges and facilities due to its connection with the Indian Air Force, ultimately impacting the employment rights of its staff.

JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:

The Supreme Court, by majority, dismissed the appeals, holding that the IAF-run school in question does not fall within the definition of 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution. The Court concluded that the relationship between the Appellants and the school was purely contractual in nature and did not involve any public law element, thus rendering the writ petitions non-maintainable.

The Court examined whether the school in question could be classified as a ‘State’ or ‘other authority’ under Article 12. It noted that although the school was affiliated with the CBSE and claimed to be financed by the IAF, there was no substantive evidence to show actual financial or administrative control by the IAF. The Education Code governing the school, while issued under the authority of the Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society (IAFE&CS), lacked statutory force and could not be treated as law. The Court also found no material evidence indicating any pervasive control of the school’s management by the IAF headquarters. It was further noted that funds may have originated from the Army Welfare Society, but this alone was insufficient to establish governmental control. Hence, the institution was considered to be a private body, and the dispute was found to arise out of a private contractual relationship without invoking any element of public law.

Justice Amanullah dissented from the majority opinion, holding that the school should be classified as an ‘authority’ under Article 12. He emphasized that the IAF Educational and Cultural Society, under whose aegis all Air Force schools are administered, is deeply linked to the IAF, with its Board chaired by a senior Air Marshal and its membership consisting of IAF officers. He further noted that many such schools are located within IAF establishments and serve the specific purpose of providing education to children of IAF personnel posted in remote or sensitive locations, thereby enjoying privileges and support from the military infrastructure. Justice Amanullah argued that the non-statutory nature of the Education Code could not alone disqualify the school from being treated as a State-controlled entity, given the nature of control and purpose behind its establishment. Thus, he held that the writ petition was maintainable and that the school fell within the purview of Article 12.

ANALYSIS:

This case presents an important constitutional question regarding the scope of Article 12 of the Indian Constitution and its applicability to institutions affiliated with government bodies. The primary issue was whether an IAF-run school, established to serve the educational needs of Indian Air Force personnel, qualifies as a ‘State’ or ‘other authority’ under Article 12. The majority of the Supreme Court held that the school functioned autonomously and lacked statutory backing or substantial governmental control, especially financial or administrative. As such, it was considered a private entity operating under a contractual framework, and the service dispute between the appellant and the school did not involve any public law element. Consequently, the Court found the writ petition to be non-maintainable, underscoring that not all institutions associated with state instrumentalities can be automatically classified as ‘State’ under the Constitution.

However, the dissenting opinion by Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah highlights the evolving nature of judicial interpretation in the context of Article 12. He argued that the school, though not governed by statutory rules, functioned under the close administrative and operational supervision of the IAF Educational and Cultural Society, with senior Air Force officers playing a central role in its governance. Emphasizing the school's strategic placement within military installations and its purpose of catering exclusively to IAF personnel and their families, Justice Amanullah reasoned that such strong institutional linkage and state-derived privileges should render the school an ‘authority’ under Article 12. His view reflects a broader, more functional approach to determining state control, advocating for constitutional accountability in institutions that serve public functions while enjoying governmental support. This case thus illustrates the tension between formalistic and purposive interpretations of constitutional provisions concerning state responsibility.