BENCH: Justice Debangsu Basak and Justice
Md. Shabbar Rashidi
FACTS:
The Trial Judge had convicted the
Appellants under Sections 376, 302, 34, 201, 34, 363, and 365 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). The victim’s father had lodged a written
complaint with the local police stating that her daughter went missing on
November 4, 2021, at about 10:00 a.m. from his house. He alleged that the
Appellant No. 1 had hidden the victim in some secret place. The local shop
owner stated that the said Appellant purchased one packet of biri and a
chocolate from his shop. Subsequently, the father of the victim had come to his
shop and asked him about the victim whereupon, he told him that the victim was
with the said Appellant. The victim’s uncle stated that the Appellant took the
victim towards the paddy field and thereafter, the police recovered the victim
in dead condition. His claim with regard to the Appellants raping and murdering
the victim was based on hearsay. Allegedly, the victim was assaulted with a
bamboo stick which was inserted in the private parts. The Single Judge awarded
death penalty to the Appellants and hence, the case was before the High Court.
ISSUES:
The primary issue before the High Court was
whether the death penalty awarded to the appellants for the brutal kidnapping,
sexual assault, and murder of a 5-year-old girl should be confirmed or
commuted. The Court also had to determine whether the possibility of
reformation of the convicts had been conclusively ruled out and whether life
imprisonment without remission could be a suitable alternative to the death
penalty in this case.
JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:
The High Court commuted the death sentences
imposed by the Trial Court and instead awarded life imprisonment to both
appellants without the possibility of remission for 60 years from the date of
the offence. It directed that their period of detention already undergone would
be set off against the sentence and instructed the appropriate authorities to
update official records and issue modified warrants accordingly.
The Court primarily relied on the precedent
set in Manoj and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, which clarified that the
death penalty should only be imposed when life imprisonment is unquestionably
foreclosed. The Court found that in this case, the possibility of reformation
of the convicts had not been ruled out. Reports submitted by the State
indicated that one appellant showed signs of positive behavioural change, while
the other maintained good conduct in the correctional facility. There was no
submission from the State indicating that rehabilitation was impossible. As
such, the Court concluded that mitigating factors were present and not entirely
outweighed by the aggravating circumstances.
However, considering the extreme brutality
of the crime, involving the sexual assault and murder of a minor, and the
deliberate attempt to conceal the offence, the Court held that a sentence of
simple life imprisonment would be inadequate. Despite acknowledging potential
for reformation, it emphasized the gravity of the crime and the need to protect
societal interests. Consequently, it imposed a punishment that balanced both
objectives: life imprisonment for 60 years without remission. This approach
allowed the Court to ensure proportionality in sentencing, maintain public
confidence in the justice system, and adhere to constitutional principles
against arbitrary or excessive punishment.
ANALYSIS:
In this case, the High Court was tasked
with reviewing the death penalty imposed by the Trial Court on two appellants
convicted of the heinous kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder of a 5-year-old
girl. The brutality of the crime, including the use of a bamboo stick in the
sexual assault and the subsequent murder and concealment of the body, shocked
the judicial conscience. However, applying the legal standards laid down in Manoj
and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Court emphasized that the death penalty
is constitutionally permissible only when life imprisonment is unquestionably
foreclosed. After examining the conduct and rehabilitation potential of the
convicts, the Court found that the possibility of their reformation had not
been conclusively negated. Reports from the State itself indicated positive behavioural
signs and no assertion that the convicts were beyond redemption.
Balancing the extreme severity of the crime
with the principles of proportionality and the possibility of reform, the Court
commuted the death penalty to life imprisonment without remission for 60 years.
This sentence served as a middle path, preserving the gravity of the punishment
while not violating constitutional safeguards against the arbitrary use of
capital punishment. The judgment reflects a maturing penal philosophy that
prioritizes fairness, reformative justice, and individualized sentencing over
retribution. It underscores the judiciary’s role in ensuring that even in the
most disturbing cases, punishment must be measured, constitutionally sound, and
informed by evidence of the offender’s capacity for change.