HARIBHAN ALIAS MONU ALIAS RAMAKANT V. STATE OF U.P 2025:AHC:193292:

DATE: 31/10/2025

COURT: High Court of Allahabad

BENCH: Justice Siddharth Mridul

FACTS:

The case arose in a bail application where the counsel for the informant, Sri Harish Chandra Shukla (referred to as the contemnor), filed a written submission dated 17.05.2025 containing allegations against the Court. Because the submission included scandalous and imputative remarks, the Court, by an order dated 28.05.2025, referred the matter to the Division Bench hearing criminal contempt cases and also directed the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to examine the contemnor’s conduct. The same order also released the bail application to be placed before the Chief Justice for listing before another Bench.

After notices were issued in the contempt proceedings, the contemnor filed a recall application seeking permission to withdraw his written submission and to recall the order of reference, arguing that he had tendered an unconditional apology. However, the record showed that the contemnor had repeatedly sought adjournments to delay the hearing of the bail application, and after contempt proceedings began, he used the pendency of the recall application to further stall the matter before the coordinate Bench. The Court noted that this conduct had effectively delayed the bail hearing for more than five months.

ISSUES:

The primary questions before the Court were whether the contemnor should be allowed to withdraw his written submission containing contemptuous allegations, whether the earlier order referring the matter for criminal contempt could be recalled, and whether the contemnor’s unqualified apology was sufficient to purge him of the contempt he had committed.

JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:

The Court declined to permit withdrawal of the written submission dated 17.05.2025 and refused to recall the order dated 28.05.2025 referring the matter to the contempt Bench and the Bar Council. Although the Court accepted the contemnor’s unconditional apology, it held that such acceptance does not automatically purge him of contempt. The recall application was thus partly allowed only to the limited extent of recording the apology, while the question of purging and punishment was left for the contempt Bench to decide.

The Court reasoned that allowing withdrawal of the offending written submission or recalling the reference order would create a dangerous precedent. If permitted, advocates could attempt to pressure or malign the Court when faced with adverse judicial conduct or an unfavourable Bench, and later escape responsibility simply by withdrawing their statements or tendering an apology. The Court emphasised that the contemnor’s written submission contained serious allegations attacking the integrity of the Court, amounting to gross contempt. His conduct demonstrated a deliberate strategy to delay the bail proceedings by repeatedly seeking adjournments, resisting the hearing, and then using the recall application to obstruct further progress. These actions not only undermined judicial functioning but also eroded public trust in the administration of justice.

The Court further held that acceptance of an apology does not automatically absolve a contemnor of contempt. Under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, the Court retains full discretion to either discharge a contemnor or merely mitigate the punishment, depending on the gravity of the contempt. Citing historical judicial precedents, the Court explained that a bona fide apology may reduce the severity of the sentence but does not erase the underlying misconduct—especially when the contempt involves scurrilous allegations against the Court’s impartiality or motives. Since the contemnor’s conduct amounted to a grave attack on the authority and dignity of the judiciary, the Court clarified that an apology cannot remove the consequences of such actions, and it remains the responsibility of the contempt Bench to determine appropriate punishment in the interest of preserving the integrity of the judicial system.

ANALYSIS:

The case highlights a significant judicial concern regarding the misuse of legal process by advocates to influence court proceedings. The contemnor’s conduct, filing a scandalous written submission, repeatedly seeking adjournments, refusing to argue the matter, and later using a recall application to stall the case—demonstrated an intentional attempt to obstruct the administration of justice. The Court treated this behaviour not merely as discourtesy but as an attack on judicial integrity, recognising that such acts undermine public confidence in the fairness and independence of the judicial system. The refusal to allow withdrawal of the written submission or recall of the reference order reflects a conscious effort by the Court to prevent the creation of a precedent where advocates could make reckless allegations and later escape liability by submitting an apology.

Further, the Court’s approach to the apology reflects a nuanced interpretation of Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. While the Court accepted the apology as a mitigating factor, it stressed that an apology does not automatically purge contempt, particularly when it involves serious allegations against the Court’s motives or impartiality. By emphasising longstanding precedents, the Court reiterated that the gravity of the contempt determines whether punishment is necessary, not merely the presence of remorse. This measured stance ensures that the power of contempt is exercised not to protect personal dignity of judges but to safeguard the authority of the judiciary as an institution. The Court’s decision to leave the question of punishment to the contempt Bench underscores the principle that accountability must follow serious misconduct, even when an apology is tendered.