BENCH: Justice Manoj Misra and Justice K.V.
Viswanathan
FACTS:
The appellant, a person with a permanent
locomotor disability assessed at 60 per cent, was appointed as an Electrician
with the Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd. (hereinafter referred to
as the first respondent) in the year 1985. As per the service rules applicable
at the time of his appointment, the appellant was scheduled to retire upon
reaching the age of 58. Based on his date of birth, he would have attained this
age on September 18, 2018. However, in accordance with the prevailing service regulations,
he would have officially remained in service until the last day of the month in
which he reached the age of superannuation—i.e., up to September 30, 2018.
In the year 2013, the State Government of
Himachal Pradesh issued an Office Memorandum (OM) granting an extension in the
age of superannuation from 58 to 60 years for government employees falling
within the physically handicapped category, specifically those who were
visually impaired. Prior to his scheduled retirement, the appellant submitted a
representation to the concerned authorities, contending that the benefit of the
extended retirement age granted under the 2013 OM should not be limited to
visually impaired employees alone but ought to be equally extended to
individuals suffering from other forms of certified physical disability,
including locomotor disability. However, the respondent Board rejected his plea
and served a formal notice of retirement in 2018. Before the effective date of
retirement, the appellant filed an Original Application before the Himachal
Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, seeking an order to enhance his retirement age
from 58 to 60 years, relying on the provisions of the 2013 OM. While the matter
remained sub judice, the State Government withdrew the 2013 OM, thereby
altering the legal basis of the appellant’s claim. As a result, the Original
Application was withdrawn. Subsequently, the appellant filed a writ petition
before the High Court challenging the denial of the age extension benefit.
However, the High Court dismissed the petition by way of the impugned order,
rejecting the appellant’s claim to extended service tenure.
ISSUES:
The key issue in this case was whether the
appellant, a person with 60% locomotor disability, was entitled to the benefit
of extended superannuation age under the Office Memorandum (OM) dated
29.03.2013, which originally applied only to visually impaired employees. The
appellant contended that limiting the benefit to one category of disability was
discriminatory and that he, too, should be allowed to continue in service until
the age of 60. The case also raised the question of whether any vested right accrued
to the appellant under the OM before it was withdrawn by the State Government
on 04.11.2019.
JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:
The Supreme Court partly allowed the
appeal, setting aside the Himachal Pradesh High Court's judgment dated
28.07.2021. It held that the appellant, being a person with a specified
benchmark disability under the 1995 and 2016 Acts, was entitled to the benefit
of the Office Memorandum (OM) dated 29.03.2013 until it was withdrawn on
04.11.2019. As such, the appellant is entitled to reinstatement for the period
from 01.10.2018 to 04.11.2019, along with full wages and all consequential
benefits affecting his pension.
In addressing the first issue, the Court
reaffirmed its position from Bhupinder
Singh v. State of Punjab, concluding that restricting the benefit
of extended superannuation age only to the visually impaired was
discriminatory. The Court clarified that all persons with benchmark
disabilities, as defined under the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities,
Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, and reaffirmed in the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, are entitled to equal treatment
in employment-related benefits, including retirement age extension. It also
distinguished the earlier Devendra
Kumar Pantcase,
emphasizing that the issue there related to promotion, not parity in retirement
benefits, and thus had no bearing on this case. Consequently, the OM dated
29.03.2013, although originally confined to the visually impaired, should have
been applied equally to employees with other benchmark disabilities.
On the second issue, the Court upheld the
legality of the subsequent OM dated 04.11.2019, which withdrew the benefit
conferred by the 2013 OM. Relying on Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, the
Court held that the power to issue executive instructions also includes the
power to amend or rescind them. Since the extension of retirement age had not
been incorporated into any statutory service rules or regulations, its
withdrawal through another OM was within the State’s administrative powers.
Furthermore, the Court held that the appellant did not have any vested or
accrued right to continue in service up to the age of 60 beyond the OM’s
withdrawal date. Nonetheless, recognizing that the appellant was eligible for
the benefit while the OM was in force, the Court granted him the right to
reinstatement and full service benefits until 04.11.2019.
ANALYSIS:
This case highlights a critical issue of
equality and non-discrimination under disability law, focusing on the unequal
application of employment benefits among categories of disabled individuals.
The Supreme Court’s decision underscores the principle that all persons with
benchmark disabilities, irrespective of the type, should receive equal
treatment in employment-related benefits, such as superannuation age
extensions. By aligning its reasoning with the precedent laid down in Bhupinder
Singh v. State of Punjab, the Court rejected the restrictive
interpretation of the 2013 Office Memorandum, which had earlier limited the
benefit of age extension solely to visually impaired employees. It affirmed
that such a narrow application was arbitrary and violated the principles
enshrined in both the 1995 and 2016 disability rights legislations, which
recognize multiple forms of benchmark disabilities. The Court’s interpretation
promotes inclusivity and equal opportunity in public employment by ensuring
that individuals with locomotor and other disabilities are not denied benefits
available to those with visual impairments.
The second core issue revolved around the
legal sustainability of the benefit after the 2013 OM was withdrawn in 2019.
Here, the Court upheld the State's authority to rescind or modify its
administrative orders under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, noting that
since the retirement age extension was not codified into statutory rules or
regulations, its withdrawal through an executive instruction was legally valid.
The Court clarified that no vested right had accrued to the appellant once the
OM was rescinded, but acknowledged that while the OM was operative, the
appellant was entitled to its benefits. As a result, the Court ordered that the
appellant be reinstated for the interim period from October 1, 2018, to
November 4, 2019, with full wages and consequential pensionary benefits. This
nuanced judgment strikes a balance between the principle of non-discrimination
and the limits of executive discretion, offering a precedent for future cases
involving administrative benefit withdrawals affecting disabled employees.