DATE: 25/09/2025
COURT: High Court of Delhi
BENCH: Justice Prateek Jalan
FACTS:
The petitioner filed a writ petition before
the Delhi High Court challenging an order dated 01.09.2025 passed by the All
India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) and sought permission to continue
in service. However, AIIMS falls under the jurisdiction of the Central
Administrative Tribunal (CAT), and disputes concerning service matters must
ordinarily be taken before the Tribunal. Notably, the petitioner had already
approached the Tribunal earlier by filing O.A. 2625/2025, in which the Tribunal
had directed AIIMS to treat the matter as a representation and pass appropriate
orders.
Despite this, instead of pursuing remedies
before the Tribunal, the petitioner directly approached the High Court by
filing the writ petition. The Registry had flagged the jurisdictional issue,
but the petitioner sought listing of the matter without raising it, claiming
that the impugned order gave rise to a fresh cause of action. The Court,
therefore, had to examine whether the writ petition was maintainable or whether
the matter should have been pursued before the Tribunal.
ISSUES:
The central issue before the Court was
whether the writ petition filed against AIIMS, a notified entity under the
jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal, was maintainable before
the High Court as the first forum, or whether the petitioner was required to
approach the Tribunal in accordance with the law laid down in L. Chandra Kumar
v. Union of India (1997) and subsequent binding precedents.
JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:
The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ
petition as withdrawn, granting the petitioner liberty to approach the Central
Administrative Tribunal for relief. The Court further directed that a copy of
the order be sent to the Delhi High Court Bar Association, cautioning that
costs may be imposed in future cases where litigants directly approach the High
Court despite clear jurisdictional bar.
The Court relied heavily on the binding
precedent of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997), where a seven-judge
bench of the Supreme Court held that matters falling within the jurisdiction of
the Central Administrative Tribunal must first be adjudicated before it, and
that the High Court cannot act as the court of first instance in such cases.
The Court reiterated that the only exception is where the validity of the
Administrative Tribunals Act itself is under challenge. To reinforce this, it
cited recent Division Bench judgments of the Delhi High Court in Parikshit
Grewal v. Union of India (2024) and Manish Kumar v. Union of India (2025),
which had clarified that litigants are proscribed from bypassing the Tribunal
and filing service-related petitions directly before the High Court.
The Court expressed concern that despite
such categorical pronouncements, writ petitions continue to be filed directly
in the High Court. It noted that counsel were aware of the jurisdictional bar
but still pressed writ petitions, often attempting to justify them on the
grounds of urgency. This practice, the Court observed, not only jeopardizes the
litigants’ interests by wasting time and resources but also burdens the writ
court unnecessarily. The Court emphasized that it may soon become necessary to
impose costs even at the stage of withdrawal of such petitions to discourage
this practice. In the present case, while the Court permitted withdrawal
without costs, it issued a clear warning by directing its order to be
circulated to the Bar Association.
ANALYSIS:
This case highlights the recurring problem
of litigants bypassing the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and directly
approaching the High Court in service-related matters, despite clear judicial
pronouncements prohibiting such practice. The Delhi High Court’s reliance on L.
Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) underscores the settled position that
the Tribunal is the exclusive court of first instance for service disputes
concerning notified entities like AIIMS. By reiterating that only challenges to
the vires of the Administrative Tribunals Act can be directly entertained by
the High Court, the judgment reinforces judicial discipline, prevents forum
shopping, and preserves the hierarchical adjudicatory framework laid down by
the Supreme Court.
At the same time, the Court’s cautionary
remarks about the increasing trend of such petitions reflect systemic concerns.
Counsel often invoke urgency or technical grounds to justify writ jurisdiction,
but this not only undermines the authority of the Tribunal but also wastes
judicial time at the High Court level. The Court’s warning that it may begin
imposing costs even upon withdrawal indicates a shift toward stricter
deterrence against misuse of writ jurisdiction. Thus, the decision serves as
both a reaffirmation of settled law and a signal to the Bar that repeated
violations of jurisdictional boundaries will invite financial consequences in
the future.
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