OLGA TELLIS V BOMBAY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 1986 AIR 180:

DATE: 12/07/1985

BENCH: Chief Justice V Chandrachud, Justice Vardarajan, Justice Chinnappa Reddy, Justice Murtaza Fazal Ali and Justice D. Tulzapurkar

FACTS:

In 1981, the State of Maharashtra, in collaboration with the Bombay Municipal Corporation, launched a large-scale campaign to evict slum and pavement dwellers from Bombay under the directive of the then Chief Minister, Mr. A. R. Antulay. This eviction drive was conducted under Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, which granted municipal authorities the power to remove encroachments on public streets without prior notice. Acting on this provision, the Chief Minister issued an order on July 13, 1981, directing the eviction and deportation of these marginalized communities to their respective places of origin.

In response to this directive, the affected slum and pavement dwellers approached the High Court of Bombay, filing a writ petition to seek protection from forcible eviction. The petitioners contended that their removal would leave them homeless and violate their fundamental rights. The High Court, recognizing the severity of the situation, granted an interim injunction that temporarily restrained the authorities from carrying out the eviction until July 21, 1981. Despite assurances from the respondents that no demolitions would be conducted until October 15, 1981, the eviction drive was forcefully executed on July 23, 1981, leading to the displacement of numerous families who were transported out of Bombay.

The petitioners subsequently challenged the legality of the eviction, arguing that it was unconstitutional and infringed upon their fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution. They contended that the eviction deprived them of their right to livelihood and dignity, both of which are integral to the right to life under Article 21. Additionally, they sought a declaration that Sections 312, 313, and 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, were unconstitutional, as they violated Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution by enabling arbitrary and unjust action against vulnerable sections of society without due process.

ISSUES:

The case raised key constitutional issues, including whether the petitioners had waived their fundamental rights by conceding to demolition, and whether Article 21's right to life included the right to livelihood and shelter. It also questioned the constitutionality of Sections 312, 313, and 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, for violating fundamental rights. Lastly, it examined whether pavement dwellers could be classified as trespassers under the Indian Penal Code, justifying their eviction.

JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:

The Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation held that the eviction of pavement and slum dwellers without following due process was unconstitutional, as it violated their fundamental right to life under Article 21, which includes the right to livelihood. However, the Court balanced this with the government’s responsibility to maintain public spaces, ruling that eviction was permissible only if carried out fairly and with proper rehabilitation. The Court upheld the validity of Sections 312, 313, and 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act but stressed that these provisions must be applied in a manner consistent with the principles of natural justice. It directed that no eviction should occur without adequate resettlement and that slums existing for over 20 years should not be removed unless alternative sites were provided.

The Court reasoned that fundamental rights cannot be waived or estopped, as no individual can surrender constitutional protections, even by consent. It reaffirmed that the right to life under Article 21 extends beyond mere existence and includes the right to live with dignity, of which livelihood is an essential component. The Court observed that depriving individuals of their means of sustenance would effectively render their right to life meaningless. Articles 39(a) and 41 of the Constitution further reinforce the State’s obligation to secure the right to livelihood and provide assistance to those in need.

The Court also considered the legal status of pavement dwellers, concluding that while they were occupying public spaces without authorization, their actions were driven by necessity rather than criminal intent. Thus, they could not be classified as trespassers under Section 441 of the IPC. The Court emphasized that natural justice cannot be denied simply because its observance may not alter the final outcome. Failure to follow due process is itself a form of prejudice. It ruled that before eviction, affected individuals must be given a fair opportunity to leave, and adequate rehabilitation must be ensured. The Court underscored that resettlement policies must not only exist in theory but must also be effectively implemented to prevent further deprivation of the evicted individuals.

ANALYSIS:

The Supreme Court’s decision in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation marked a significant development in constitutional law by affirming that the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to livelihood. The Court recognized that depriving individuals of their means of sustenance would render their right to life meaningless, reinforcing the principle that economic survival is integral to human dignity. While upholding the government’s authority to regulate public spaces, the Court emphasized that such power must be exercised fairly and in accordance with natural justice. It held that eviction without due process and rehabilitation was unconstitutional, ensuring that state actions must align with constitutional protections, particularly for vulnerable communities. 

Additionally, the Court’s ruling rejected the classification of pavement dwellers as trespassers under the Indian Penal Code, acknowledging that their occupation of public spaces was driven by necessity rather than criminal intent. By mandating proper rehabilitation before eviction, the judgment balanced urban development needs with social justice considerations. The Court’s emphasis on resettlement policies underscored the State’s responsibility to provide viable housing alternatives, setting a precedent for a more inclusive interpretation of fundamental rights. The decision reinforced that even statutory powers must be exercised within constitutional limits, ensuring that laws do not disproportionately harm marginalized populations.