In this case, Petitioner No. 1, Revacure
Lifesciences LLP, and its partners and employees faced a criminal complaint
filed by Respondent No. 2, M/s Bhardwaj India Private Limited, alleging that
the Petitioners supplied defective medicines, specifically Docetaxel 20 mg
vials with broken glass and visible foreign particles. The complaint led the
learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, to direct registration of FIR No.
0053/2019 under Sections 274 and 275 IPC and Section 13 of the Drugs and
Cosmetics Act, 1940 (D&C Act), under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The Petitioners
contended that the drugs were manufactured under a Loan License Agreement,
whereby Respondent No. 2 retained full responsibility for product quality,
strength, and purity, while Petitioners merely provided their manufacturing
facility, staff, and equipment. They argued that the allegations were part of a
commercial dispute and an attempt by Respondent No. 2 to extort money or defame
the Petitioners after failing to sell the products in the market.
The Petitioners further claimed that
Respondent No. 3, Mr. Mohan Bhardwaj, intentionally contaminated the products
after delivery and coerced an employee of the Petitioners to falsely accept
liability. Multiple inspections, including by the Central Drugs Standard
Control Organization and State Drug Inspectors, reportedly cleared the
Petitioners of wrongdoing, confirming that the products met pharmacopeial
standards for assay and sterility. They also contended that offences under the
D&C Act are non-cognizable and only a Drug Inspector has the authority to
initiate criminal proceedings, making the police registration of the FIR
improper. The Petitioners argued that the MM’s order directing the FIR was
non-speaking and ignored key facts, such as the Loan License arrangement and
the reports absolving them, thereby amounting to abuse of process and
necessitating quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
ISSUES:
The main issues in this case were whether
the FIR registered against Petitioner No. 1 under Sections 274 and 275 IPC and
Section 13 of the Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1940 (D&C Act) disclosed a
prima facie cognizable offence, whether the Petitioners could be held
responsible for alleged adulteration of drugs manufactured under a Loan License
Agreement, and whether the police had jurisdiction to register the FIR or if
the matter fell exclusively within the authority of the Drugs Inspector.
Additionally, the court considered whether continuation of the FIR after a long
delay violated principles of expediency and limitation under the Criminal
Procedure Code.
JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:
The Court allowed the petition and quashed
FIR No. 053/2019 under Sections 274 and 275 IPC and Section 13 of the D&C
Act, registered at PS Okhla Industrial Area. The Court clarified that the
observations pertained only to the quashing of this FIR and did not constitute
an opinion on any other proceedings under the D&C Act or other laws.
The Court observed that Section 275 IPC
pertains to the sale of adulterated drugs, whereas the complaint only involved
the manufacturing of drugs, and there was no allegation that the products were
sold in the market. Similarly, Section 274 IPC applies to adulteration intended
for sale or medicinal use. The Court analyzed the Loan License Agreement
between the parties, noting that Petitioner No. 1 merely provided its
manufacturing facility, staff, and equipment while Respondent No. 2, the loan
licensee, retained sole responsibility for the quality, purity, and strength of
the drugs. Joint inspections by the Drugs Inspector and CDSCO confirmed that
the control samples from the Petitioner’s premises were of standard quality,
and no adulteration was observed at the time of dispatch. The adulteration, in
the form of foreign particles, was only reported after the products reached the
Respondent’s premises, indicating that the Petitioners could not be held
responsible.
The Court further emphasized that under the
D&C Act, only a competent Drugs Inspector has authority to initiate
prosecution, making the police registration of the FIR under Section 13 of the
Act without jurisdiction. Additionally, the FIR was registered in 2019, but the
investigation had not been concluded for over six years, exceeding the
limitation period under Section 468 Cr.P.C. for the IPC offences, which
rendered the continuation of the investigation legally and practically
untenable. Considering these facts, the Court held that there was no prima
facie case against the Petitioners under either IPC or the D&C Act, and
continuation of the FIR amounted to an abuse of process, thereby justifying its
quashing in the interest of justice.
ANALYSIS:
This case highlights the legal significance
of the Loan License framework under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. The
Petitioners, as owners of the manufacturing facility, were not involved in the
actual production or quality control of the drugs, which was the responsibility
of the loan licensee, Respondent No. 2. The Court’s analysis demonstrates that
mere possession of manufacturing infrastructure does not automatically confer
liability for alleged defects in products, especially when inspections confirm
compliance with pharmacopeial standards at the time of dispatch. The sequence
of events indicated that the alleged adulteration or contamination occurred
after the products left the Petitioners’ premises, emphasizing the importance
of establishing causation and responsibility before initiating criminal
proceedings.
The case also underscores procedural
safeguards and limitations in criminal law. The FIR was registered by the
police under Sections 274 and 275 IPC and Section 13 of the D&C Act, even
though the Act itself grants prosecutorial authority only to a competent Drugs
Inspector, rendering the FIR procedurally improper. Moreover, the FIR was filed
in 2019, but investigations remained incomplete for over six years, surpassing
statutory limitation periods under the Cr.P.C., which could render any eventual
prosecution legally indefensible. The Court’s decision to quash the FIR under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. thus reflects a careful balancing of substantive and
procedural law, preventing misuse of criminal process in commercial disputes
and ensuring that liability is attributed only where prima facie evidence
justifies prosecution.