DATE: 10.04.2002
COURT: Supreme Court of India
BENCH: Chief Justice S.P. Bharucha, Justice
S.S.M. Quadri, Justice U.C. Banerjee, Justice S.N. Variava, and Justice
Shivaraj V. Patil.
FACTS:
Rupa Ashok Hurra and Ashok Hurra, who were
married and had been living separately for several years due to matrimonial
discord, initially reached a settlement for divorce by mutual consent under
Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act. A consent decree for dissolution of
marriage was passed by the Supreme Court in a transferred petition on 27 March
1996 (or around that period), which also included terms regarding alimony and
property settlement.
Thereafter, Rupa Ashok Hurra withdrew her
consent to the divorce, alleging that it had been obtained under coercion or
fraud, and challenged the validity of the decree. The matter led to a civil
appeal before the Supreme Court (Civil Appeal No. 1843 of 1997), which upheld
the divorce decree on 10 March 1997. Her subsequent review petition against
this judgment was dismissed, prompting her to file a writ petition under
Article 32 of the Constitution questioning the judgment on grounds of violation
of fundamental rights, including procedural injustice. This writ petition,
along with connected matters, was referred by a three-judge bench to a
Constitution Bench, raising the larger question of whether any relief could be
sought against a final Supreme Court judgment after dismissal of a review
petition.
ISSUES:
The primary issues were (i) whether an
aggrieved person is entitled to any relief against a final judgment/order of
the Supreme Court after dismissal of the review petition, either under Article
32 or otherwise; (ii) whether the Supreme Court can correct its own order under
inherent powers after the review is dismissed, particularly on grounds of lack
of jurisdiction, violation of natural justice, bias, abuse of process, or
miscarriage of justice; and (iii) the requirements and parameters for
entertaining such a post-review “curative” petition under the Court’s inherent
powers.
JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:
The five-judge Constitution Bench held that
a final judgment or order of the Supreme Court cannot be assailed by way of a
writ petition under Article 32 after dismissal of a review petition, whether
the aggrieved person was a party to the original proceedings or not. However,
the Court recognised its inherent power (under Articles 129 and 142) to
reconsider its own final judgments in the rarest of rare cases to prevent abuse
of process and cure gross miscarriage of justice. It laid down the concept and
procedural framework of a “curative petition” as an extraordinary remedy,
subject to strict safeguards. In the present writ petitions, the Court directed
them to be processed despite procedural deficiencies but found no merit for
reopening the original judgment, thereby upholding its finality while
establishing the curative jurisdiction for future cases.
The Court first addressed the
non-maintainability of Article 32 petitions against the Supreme Court’s own
judgments by emphasising the limited scope of Article 32 as a remedy for
enforcement of fundamental rights against the “State” (under Article 12). It
clarified that judicial orders of superior courts, including the Supreme Court,
do not constitute State action amenable to writ jurisdiction, and a writ of
certiorari cannot be issued to a co-ordinate or superior court. Relying on
established precedents such as Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of
Maharashtra and the majority view in A.R.
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, the Bench held that once a matter has
been finally decided by the Supreme Court and a review under Article 137 and
the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 has been dismissed (even by circulation), the
judgment attains finality under Article 141. Allowing Article 32 challenges
would undermine the doctrine of stare decisis, create uncertainty in the
administration of justice, open floodgates to endless litigation, and erode the
hierarchical structure of the judiciary. The principle of finality was
described as essential to public interest and the rule of law; any exception
must be narrowly confined to prevent perpetual uncertainty.
At the same time, the Bench balanced
finality with the Court’s paramount duty to render complete justice by invoking
its inherent powers under Articles 129 (as a court of record) and 142. It
reasoned that in the rarest of rare cases where a final judgment suffers from
patent lack of jurisdiction, gross violation of natural justice (e.g., a party
not served notice or not heard), or undisclosed bias by a judge giving rise to
reasonable apprehension of bias, the Court must act ex debito justitiae
(out of debt of justice) to prevent abuse of process and irremediable
miscarriage of justice. Drawing from cases like Harbans Singh v. State of
U.P., Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India,
and international authority such as Ex parte Pinochet (No. 2),
the Court held that while finality serves certainty, the overriding judicial
conscience demands correction in extraordinary situations. To cabin this power
and avoid routine second reviews, the judgment prescribed stringent procedural
safeguards: the curative petition must specifically aver that the grounds were
raised in the review petition (and dismissed by circulation); it requires
certification by a Senior Advocate confirming fulfilment of the criteria; it is
first circulated to a bench of the three senior-most Judges and the Judges who
passed the impugned judgment (if available); only if a majority finds merit
does it proceed to hearing before the same bench (as far as possible), with
possible imposition of exemplary costs for frivolous filings. This framework
ensures the remedy remains exceptional while upholding justice.
ANALYSIS:
The judgment in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok
Hurra marks a landmark evolution in Indian constitutional and
administrative jurisprudence by introducing the doctrine of curative petitions
as an extraordinary post-review remedy, while firmly reinforcing the finality
of Supreme Court decisions. Stemming from a matrimonial dispute involving a
consent divorce decree under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act (later
challenged on grounds of coercion, fraud, and procedural injustice), the case
transcended its facts when a three-judge bench referred it to a five-judge
Constitution Bench. The Court categorically held that Article 32 writ petitions
are not maintainable against the Supreme Court’s final judgments after review
dismissal under Article 137, as judicial orders do not constitute “State
action” amenable to writ jurisdiction. This preserved the sanctity of Article
141 (law declared by the Supreme Court as binding) and prevented the opening of
floodgates to endless litigation. At the same time, invoking the Court’s
inherent powers under Articles 129 (as a court of record) and 142 (to do
complete justice), the Bench recognized a narrow jurisdiction to entertain
curative petitions in the rarest of rare cases involving gross miscarriage of
justice, such as patent lack of jurisdiction, violation of natural justice
principles (e.g., non-service of notice or non-hearing of a party), or
undisclosed bias creating reasonable apprehension. By doing so, the judgment
struck a delicate balance between the public interest in certainty and finality
of adjudication (essential to the rule of law and stare decisis) and the
overriding judicial conscience to prevent irremediable injustice, drawing
support from precedents like Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar, A.R.
Antulay, Harbans Singh, and Union
Carbide, as well as international authority like Ex
parte Pinochet (No. 2).
Critically, the Court’s reasoning
demonstrates a pragmatic yet principled approach to judicial self-correction,
institutionalizing stringent procedural safeguards to ensure the curative
remedy remains exceptional and not a disguised second review. These include the
mandatory requirement that grounds must have been specifically urged (and
dismissed) in the earlier review petition, certification by a Senior Advocate
verifying fulfillment of the criteria, preliminary circulation of the petition
to a bench comprising the three senior-most Judges and the Judges who passed
the impugned order (if available), and hearing only if a majority finds prima
facie merit, ideally before the same bench with possible imposition of exemplary
costs for frivolous filings. This framework cabins potential abuse while
empowering the apex court to act ex debito justitiae in
extraordinary situations, thereby enhancing public trust in the judiciary
without undermining its hierarchical structure or finality doctrine. The
decision’s broader significance lies in its enduring impact: it has become the
foundational precedent for all subsequent curative petitions, reinforcing the
Supreme Court’s role as the ultimate guardian of justice while safeguarding
against routine challenges to its authority. In the present writ petitions, the
Bench processed them despite procedural lapses but found no merit to reopen the
original 1997 divorce decree, thereby upholding finality in the instant case
while laying down a enduring mechanism for future exceptional relief.
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