S. PANCHALINGU & ORS. V. PEOPLE’S EDUCATION TRUST (R) MANDYA & ORS WRIT PETITION NO.16971 OF 2025 (GM – CPC):

DATE: 25/06/2025

COURT: High Court of Karnataka

BENCH: Justice M. Nagaprasanna

FACTS:

The parties involved in this batch of writ petitions are common and the dispute arises out of certain orders passed by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mandya, in Miscellaneous No. 26 of 2025. The core issue relates to the governance of the People's Education Trust (PES), Mandya, which manages several educational institutions. On 11-07-1988, a trust deed was executed by PES, and Rules and Bye-laws were subsequently framed. Alleging mismanagement and irregularities, three petitioners approached the District Court under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), seeking the framing of a scheme for proper governance of the Trust. Along with the plaint, they filed an application for leave to institute the suit and another interlocutory application (I.A. No. II) under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, seeking a temporary injunction to restrain the Trust and its office-bearers, particularly the President, from continuing in their positions without fresh elections by secret ballot. Despite the pending suit, the trustees passed a resolution on 28-03-2025 to continue the second respondent as President.

Subsequently, another application (I.A. No. IV of 2025) was filed under Section 151 CPC, seeking a court direction to conduct elections by secret ballot. On 02-05-2025, the District Court issued an interim order constituting an ad hoc committee comprising all trustees to govern the Trust. It further directed respondents 2 and 5 to submit daily reports to the Court and restrained them from using their designations as President and Secretary. This led to Writ Petition No. 16223 of 2025 being filed, seeking modification of the interim order to specify the functioning procedure of the ad hoc committee and further restrain respondents 2 and 5 from decision-making roles. After the writ petition was listed and acknowledged by the District Court, on 11-06-2025, it modified its earlier order on the ground that no interim order or notice had been issued in the writ petition. The order dated 02-05-2025, as modified on 11-06-2025, has now been challenged in the current set of writ petitions before the High Court.

ISSUES:

The central issue in this case was whether the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mandya, had the jurisdiction to pass interim orders dated 02-05-2025 and 11-06-2025 in a suit filed under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) without first granting leave to institute the suit. The petitions challenged these orders on the ground that the court had acted without jurisdiction, thereby rendering its actions legally invalid. The matter also raised the broader question of the procedural sanctity and threshold requirement of leave under Section 92 CPC in suits involving public charitable or religious trusts.

JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:

The High Court partially allowed the batch of writ petitions. It dismissed Writ Petition No. 16971 of 2025 which had sought restoration of the original interim order dated 02-05-2025. It allowed Writ Petition No. 17445 of 2025, thereby quashing the interim order dated 02-05-2025 and all subsequent orders based on it. Writ Petition No. 16223 of 2025 was also dismissed. However, the Court granted liberty to the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mandya, to pass appropriate orders strictly in accordance with law after complying with the procedural requirements under Section 92 CPC.

The Court emphasized that Section 92 of the CPC is not a mere procedural provision but a substantive legal safeguard that prevents frivolous or malicious litigation against public charitable and religious trusts. It held that the grant of leave under Section 92 is not a casual or optional exercise but a mandatory precondition for invoking the jurisdiction of the civil court. The suit, in the absence of such leave, lacks legal standing and remains a mere "scheme plaint" with no judicial force. The Court found that the District Court had erred in passing interim orders in a suit which had not been activated by the grant of leave, thereby acting beyond its jurisdiction.

The Court further noted that the urgency cited by the District Court, namely the approaching summer vacation, did not provide a valid statutory justification for bypassing the legal requirement under Section 92. Interim reliefs such as constituting an ad hoc committee and restraining trust officials from acting in their official capacities could not be granted unless the Court was lawfully seized of the matter. Since no leave had been granted at the time the impugned orders were passed, the judicial proceedings were legally inert and the orders issued therein lacked enforceability. The Court concluded that the orders passed were without jurisdiction and thus deserved to be quashed.

ANALYSIS:

This case underscores the critical importance of adhering to the statutory prerequisites laid down under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code in matters involving public charitable and religious trusts. The High Court rightly emphasized that the grant of leave to institute a suit is not a procedural nicety but a jurisdictional threshold that must be crossed before any judicial action can be taken. The District Court’s failure to grant such leave before passing substantive interim orders, including the constitution of an ad hoc committee and the restraint of trust functionaries, amounted to an overreach of judicial authority. By acting without first establishing its jurisdiction through the statutorily mandated process, the District Court rendered its orders legally void. This case highlights that courts must exercise caution and adhere strictly to procedural safeguards to avoid undermining the legitimacy of the judicial process.

Furthermore, the High Court's refusal to validate the District Court’s actions, even in light of administrative exigencies such as the approaching summer vacation, reflects a strong judicial commitment to procedural discipline. The Court’s ruling makes clear that urgency cannot justify the circumvention of statutory mandates. This decision serves as an important precedent for reinforcing judicial propriety in scheme suits under Section 92 CPC, reinforcing the principle that the judiciary’s power must be exercised within the bounds of the law, and not merely in response to practical concerns or institutional convenience.