DATE: 12/11/2025
COURT: High Court of Madras
BENCH: Justice B. Pugalendhi
FACTS:
The petitioner, the sole accused in PRC No.
75 of 2025 before the Judicial Magistrate III, Dindigul, faced charges under
Sections 69 and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The prosecution
alleged that the defacto complainant, an Advocate enrolled in 2018, had known
the petitioner since their college days in Madurai. Their acquaintance
developed into a relationship, and on 11 March 2020, the petitioner allegedly
invited her to a motor shed near his village and had sexual intercourse with
her against her will on the pretext of marriage. According to the complaint,
the parties continued to have sexual relations thereafter, and when the
complainant sought clarity about marriage, the petitioner allegedly refused
and, on 25 January 2025, threatened her by citing caste differences.
The petitioner contended that the
relationship was entirely consensual, voluntary, and based on mutual affection.
He argued that no deception existed at the inception of the relationship, and
the complaint was made only after the relationship soured. The complainant,
being legally educated and a practising Advocate, fully understood the
implications of her actions, according to the petitioner. In contrast, the
prosecution claimed that the petitioner induced the relationship through a
false promise of marriage and later refused to fulfil it, thus satisfying the
ingredients of Section 69 BNS.
ISSUES:
The core issues before the Court were
whether the allegations disclosed the offences under Sections 69 and 351(2) of
the BNS, specifically: (1) whether the petitioner engaged in sexual relations
with the complainant through deceitful means or on a false promise of marriage
without intention to fulfil it at the inception; and (2) whether the
petitioner’s alleged refusal to marry and subsequent conduct satisfied the
elements of criminal intimidation under Section 351(2) BNS.
JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:
The Court quashed the proceedings in PRC
No. 75 of 2025, holding that continuation of the prosecution would amount to an
abuse of process. It found no material suggesting that the petitioner had a
fraudulent or mala fide intent to deceive the complainant at the beginning of
the relationship. The prolonged consensual nature of the relationship negated
the applicability of Section 69 BNS, and the ingredients of criminal
intimidation under Section 351(2) were also not fulfilled. Accordingly, the
Criminal Original Petition was allowed.
In arriving at its decision, the Court
relied on a series of Supreme Court precedents distinguishing between a genuine
relationship that later fails and a sexually exploitative relationship entered
into through deception. Citing Deepak Gulati, Mahesh Damu Khare, Amol Bhagwan
Nehul, and Biswajyoti Chatterjee, the Court reiterated that criminal liability
under provisions relating to false promise of marriage arises only where the
accused never intended to marry the complainant from the outset. A failed relationship
or subsequent unwillingness to marry, without evidence of mala fide intent at
inception, does not amount to deceit. Long-term consensual intimacy,
particularly one spanning several years without protest, undermines the
argument that consent was induced by a false promise or misconception of fact.
The complainant’s legal education and professional background further supported
the conclusion that she was fully aware of the nature and consequences of her
actions, making retrospective claims of deception implausible.
Regarding criminal intimidation under
Section 351(2) BNS, the Court found no material to indicate that the petitioner
issued any threat intended to alarm the complainant or coerce her into doing
something she was not legally bound to do. Relying on Prashant v. State (NCT of
Delhi), the Court noted that when parties voluntarily maintain a relationship
of intimacy, subsequent disputes arising from the breakdown of that
relationship cannot retroactively constitute criminal intimidation. The alleged
threat cited in the complaint was viewed within the context of relationship
discord rather than a genuine attempt to cause fear or compel conduct. The
Court also observed a growing tendency to invoke criminal law in matters rooted
in personal relationships and emotional fallout, cautioning that the criminal
process should not be misused to moralise or litigate private choices between
consenting adults. The absence of foundational criminal elements in the
allegations compelled the Court to quash the proceedings to prevent misuse of
the justice system.
ANALYSIS:
The central aspect of this case lies in
distinguishing consensual relationships from those vitiated by deception under
Section 69 of the BNS. The Court examined whether the petitioner’s alleged
promise to marry amounted to a false representation made with fraudulent intent
at the inception of the relationship. The complainant and petitioner maintained
a long-term intimate relationship spanning nearly five years, during which the
complainant—an Advocate fully aware of legal implications, continued to engage
in the relationship without protest. This prolonged consensual engagement
significantly weakened the claim that her consent was obtained under a
misconception of fact. By grounding its analysis in established Supreme Court
precedents such as Deepak Gulati and Mahesh Damu Khare, the Court reaffirmed
that only promises made with mala fide intent at the beginning can constitute
“deceitful means.” Mere failure to fulfil a future promise, relationship
breakdown, or emotional fallout cannot be treated as criminal conduct when the
consensual nature of the relationship is evident.
In assessing the charge under Section
351(2) BNS, the Court emphasised that criminal intimidation requires a specific
intent to cause alarm or compel the victim into an unlawful act. The alleged
threat made by the petitioner arose in the context of a relationship that had
already deteriorated, and the complaint lacked material indicating any
deliberate attempt to cause fear or coercion. Relying on Prashant v. State (NCT
of Delhi), the Court held that disagreements or harsh exchanges following the
end of a consensual relationship do not automatically transform into criminal
intimidation. The Court further underscored the increasing misuse of criminal
provisions in private relationship disputes, stressing that the law must not be
invoked to pursue moral grievances or emotional dissatisfaction. Given the
absence of the essential criminal elements under both Sections 69 and 351(2),
the Court correctly concluded that the prosecution would amount to an abuse of
process and therefore quashed the proceedings.
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