BENCH: Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice K. Vinod Chandran
FACTS:
In this case, the State of Karnataka has challenged the Karnataka High Court’s order dated 25.04.2024, which quashed the entire proceedings initiated against respondent no.1, Sri Channakeshava H.D., under Section 13(1)(b) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, in connection with a Disproportionate Assets (DA) case. The respondent, who was initially appointed as an Assistant Engineer in 1998 and later promoted to Executive Engineer in BESCOM, was alleged to have amassed assets disproportionate to his known sources of income while serving as a public servant. An FIR (No. 54/2023) was registered on 04.12.2023 by the Karnataka Lokayukta Police under the aforementioned provisions of the PC Act.
Respondent no.1 approached the High Court to quash the FIR on the ground that the investigation had been initiated in violation of the second proviso to Section 17 of the PC Act, which mandates prior approval from a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police (SP) for investigating offences under Section 13(1)(b). The High Court found that although such approval had been granted by the SP, it was done without a preliminary inquiry or proper application of mind, thereby affecting the validity of the proceedings. The State, however, argued that a preliminary inquiry is not a mandatory requirement under the proviso and that the SP had indeed acted based on a source report dated 05.10.2023 before issuing the approval.
ISSUES:
The main issue that was presented before the Apex Court was one which casted doubt over the judgement made by the High Court quashing the FIR against the accused.
JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s order that had quashed the FIR registered against the public servant. The Court held that the FIR, based on a detailed source report indicating prima facie evidence of disproportionate assets, was validly registered without a mandatory preliminary enquiry.
The Court held that although a preliminary enquiry is often considered desirable in corruption cases, it is not a mandatory legal requirement. This position has been clarified in multiple judgments, including Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, where the Court stated that a preliminary enquiry may be conducted depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. Further reliance was placed on State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy, where it was reiterated that the necessity of such an enquiry is discretionary. The Court emphasized that if the competent authority, such as a Superintendent of Police, is in possession of a detailed and reasoned source report that clearly discloses a cognizable offence, a preliminary enquiry can be dispensed with. The presence of such material is sufficient to justify the registration of an FIR under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
In response to the argument that the public servant should have been given an opportunity to explain his position before the FIR was registered, the Court firmly rejected the notion of any such right at the pre-FIR stage. It relied on the ruling in CBI v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi, which clarified that a public servant accused of possessing disproportionate assets does not have an inherent right to be heard prior to the registration of an FIR. The Court noted that the source report in this case, prepared by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, was detailed and specific, identifying significant discrepancies in the public servant’s asset holdings and indicating probable benami transactions. The SP’s decision to register an FIR was based on this report and was thus held to be reasonable and legally sound. Therefore, the High Court’s quashing of the FIR was deemed unjustified, leading to the reinstatement of the FIR and the continuation of the investigation.
ANALYSIS:
This case underscores the nuanced balance between procedural safeguards and the imperative to effectively investigate corruption allegations involving public servants. The Supreme Court’s decision reaffirms the principle that while a preliminary enquiry may be desirable in certain cases—particularly those involving complex or personal matters like matrimonial disputes or medical negligence—it is not an indispensable precondition for registering an FIR in corruption cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court emphasized that discretion lies with the investigating authority, and where credible, detailed, and well-reasoned material such as a source report is available, a formal preliminary enquiry may be skipped without violating procedural fairness. This reinforces the practical approach to anti-corruption proceedings by avoiding unnecessary delays in initiating investigations.
Additionally, the judgment affirms that the rights of a public servant under investigation do not extend to being heard before an FIR is registered. The Court’s reliance on CBI v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi makes it clear that such pre-FIR hearings are not a legal entitlement, especially in the context of corruption cases where evidence gathering is often sensitive and may be compromised by early disclosure. The case also serves as a precedent in validating FIRs grounded in substantive preliminary reports, thus discouraging accused individuals from seeking FIR quashing merely due to the absence of a separate preliminary enquiry. By setting aside the High Court’s order, the Supreme Court reinforced the principle that the sufficiency and credibility of material at the pre-FIR stage are pivotal, not the procedural formality of an enquiry, especially when weighed against the broader goal of public accountability and clean governance.