TAPI VALLEY AGRO FOOD PRODUCTS COMPANY V. DONDAICHA WARWADE NAGAR PARISHAD & ORS 2026:BHC-AUG:9909-DB:

DATE: 09.03.2026

COURT: High Court of Bombay

BENCH: Justice Vibha Kankanwadi and Justice Hiten S. Venegavkar

FACTS:

The case concerns a partnership firm operating an agro-based enterprise that was granted possession of a municipal slaughterhouse constructed on Gut No. 123 at Dondaicha, District Dhule, Maharashtra. The land had been donated by one Baburao Banjara to the Nagar Parishad (respondent No. 1) on 8 August 2008 for public purposes, and the slaughterhouse was built in 2010 under a Government Resolution dated 19 January 2009 as part of an integrated housing/slum development programme. Unable to manage and operate the facility due to lack of funds and manpower, the municipal council resolved to lease it out through public auction. The petitioner emerged as the highest bidder, took possession on 3 January 2011, and executed a five-year lease agreement on 17 January 2011. Subsequently, the Standing Committee extended the tenure to 30 years effective April 2011, culminating in a fresh agreement dated 24 May 2012. The petitioner invested heavily, obtained various regulatory approvals (including pollution control consents, factory licence, food safety licence, ETP NOC, APEDA-related documents, GST registration, MSME/Udyam registration, and ISO/HACCP certifications), and commenced operations after the municipal council passed Resolution No. 12 dated 27 April 2012 and issued an NOC on 4 October 2012.

Disputes arose thereafter due to political opposition, public complaints, and allegations of irregularities, leading to multiple resolutions and proceedings. The Collector stayed the municipal resolution on 16 May 2013, but the Divisional Commissioner, Nashik, set it aside on 30 July 2013 (unchallenged thereafter). In 2017, the petitioner filed Regular Civil Suit No. 3 of 2017 seeking permanent injunction. The municipal General Body passed Resolution No. 61 dated 1 March 2017 cancelling the 30-year agreement and withdrawing NOCs/permissions. The trial court initially granted status quo on 2 March 2017, later vacated the interim order on 13 November 2017, leading to sealing and dispossession on 15 November 2017. The petitioner succeeded in appeal and writ proceedings, culminating in this Court’s order dated 12 September 2018 in Writ Petition No. 5580 of 2018 restoring status quo ante as on 13 February 2017, directing de-sealing, and protecting possession pending suit. The civil suit was decreed on 31 January 2022 in the petitioner’s favour granting perpetual injunction, and the municipal council’s Civil Appeal No. 82 of 2022 remains pending without any stay. Despite the decree, the Nagar Parishad refused to issue a fresh NOC for appointment of veterinary doctors (required by the Animal Husbandry Department and for APEDA inspection/approval), citing pendency of the appeal and alleged cancellation of earlier permissions, as communicated on 17 February 2025. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present writ petition under Article 226 seeking directions for issuance of NOC and reinstatement/renewal of licences/permissions/NOCs.

ISSUES:

The issues presented in this case before the Bombay High Court concerned the legality of the Nagar Parishad’s refusal to issue a No Objection Certificate (NOC) for appointment of veterinary doctors at the petitioner’s slaughterhouse and its failure to reinstate/renew municipal licences, permissions, and NOCs, despite a subsisting civil court decree protecting the petitioner’s possession and operations pending appeal without stay. The core questions were whether the municipal authority could lawfully withhold statutory/regulatory approvals on the ground of a pending civil appeal (without stay) or alleged infirmities in the 30-year lease agreement (non-registration and non-compliance with Section 92 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils Act, 1965); whether such refusal was arbitrary, violative of principles of natural justice, and in disregard of binding judicial orders; whether the writ petition was maintainable despite availability of alternate remedies under Section 308 of the 1965 Act; and whether mandamus could issue to compel performance of the municipal council’s public/statutory duty under Section 49(2) of the 1965 Act to facilitate regulated slaughterhouse operations in the interest of public health and hygiene.

JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:

In its judgement, the Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition, quashed the impugned communication dated 17 February 2025 refusing/objection to issuance of NOC, and directed respondent Nos. 1 to 3 (Nagar Parishad and its authorities) to issue the requisite NOC within two weeks to enable the Animal Husbandry Department to appoint veterinary doctor(s) for ante-mortem examination and allied functions, subject to standard lawful conditions. The Court further directed respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to process and issue municipal renewals/permissions/NOCs within their statutory domain within two weeks where the petitioner satisfied requirements and where approvals from competent regulators (MPCB, FSSAI, factory licence etc.) remained in force. Respondent No. 4 (Animal Husbandry Department) was directed to expeditiously process the appointment request (preferably within two weeks thereafter), and respondent No. 5 (APEDA) to deal with inspection/approval requests in accordance with its scheme, taking note of the order and the operative civil decree. The rule was made absolute with no order as to costs, with express clarification that all contentions overlapping the pending Civil Appeal No. 82 of 2022 were left open for adjudication on merits without being influenced by the present judgment.

The Court held the writ petition maintainable despite the availability of alternate remedies under Section 308 of the 1965 Act, reasoning that the rule of alternate remedy is discretionary and not jurisdictional. Invoking Supreme Court precedents such as Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (2003), it observed that writ jurisdiction is exercisable where the impugned administrative action is palpably arbitrary, violates principles of natural justice, disregards binding judicial orders, or obstructs performance of a public/statutory duty. Here, the refusal to issue NOC was not a mere private contractual dispute but an administrative obstruction impacting statutory compliance for regulated slaughterhouse operations (veterinary oversight, pollution control, public health safeguards), founded on irrelevant considerations (pendency of appeal without stay) and effectively frustrating a subsisting civil decree. The Court rejected the respondents’ contention that the petitioner ought to have separately challenged the 1 March 2017 resolution under Section 308, holding that the provision is a supervisory mechanism and does not bar writ jurisdiction when the municipal action defeats operative judicial findings and inter-partes orders. The decree of 31 January 2022 (granting perpetual injunction protecting possession) and the earlier order dated 12 September 2018 in Writ Petition No. 5580 of 2018 (restoring status quo ante) remained binding and enforceable until stayed or reversed, and the municipal council could not, by unilateral administrative refusal, nullify their effect or treat the decree as inoperative merely because an appeal was pending.

The Court further reasoned that the municipal council’s obligatory duty under Section 49(2) of the 1965 Act to make reasonable provision for slaughterhouses as part of hygienic municipal administration could not be discharged arbitrarily or inconsistently. Having itself constructed the facility, leased it through public auction, extended the tenure, issued NOCs/permissions, and permitted operations for years, the council could not later withhold basic regulatory facilitation (such as NOC for veterinary appointment) on extraneous grounds like public opposition or political complaints without a reasoned, procedurally fair determination of statutory violations. The impugned refusal stood on the communication dated 17 February 2025, which rested principally on pendency of proceedings and alleged past cancellation, grounds that could not sustain in light of Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner (1978) and Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji (1952), which mandate that public orders must stand or fall on their own recorded reasons and cannot be supplemented by subsequent explanations. The Court clarified that alleged infirmities in the 30-year lease (non-registration, alleged violation of Section 92 requiring State sanction) were matters for the appellate court in Civil Appeal No. 82 of 2022 and could not justify short-circuiting the operative decree through administrative action. Mandamus was therefore justified to compel performance of the public duty, as explained in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani (1989), ensuring that technicalities do not obstruct regulated compliance and public health safeguards. The relief was narrowly tailored to enforcement of NOC issuance and renewal of municipal permissions where statutory conditions were otherwise met, leaving substantive contractual and title issues open for the civil appeal.

ANALYSIS:

The Bombay High Court’s judgment in this writ petition represents a robust affirmation of the supremacy of operative judicial decrees over unilateral administrative actions by local bodies, even in the face of a pending appeal without stay. By quashing the Nagar Parishad’s refusal to issue a fresh NOC for veterinary doctor appointment and directing expeditious issuance of municipal permissions/renewals, the Court effectively prevented the municipal authority from frustrating the implementation of a subsisting civil decree that protected the petitioner’s possession and right to operate the slaughterhouse pending final appellate adjudication. The ruling underscores that a decree granting perpetual injunction remains binding and enforceable until stayed or set aside, and administrative authorities cannot treat it as non-existent or inoperative merely by citing pendency of an appeal. The decision reinforces the principle that public bodies, having themselves established and leased a civic facility (here a slaughterhouse) under statutory obligations, cannot arbitrarily obstruct regulated operations through extraneous considerations such as political opposition or unadjudicated complaints, particularly when such refusal impedes compliance with higher statutory frameworks (veterinary oversight under Animal Husbandry rules, APEDA approvals, pollution and food safety norms).

This judgment carries significant precedential value in balancing municipal autonomy with judicial finality and public interest in regulated civic infrastructure. It clarifies that mandamus lies to compel performance of obligatory duties under Section 49(2) of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils Act, 1965, where withholding basic regulatory facilitation (like NOC issuance) defeats public health, hygiene, and lawful economic activity without a reasoned, procedurally fair determination of statutory breaches. By narrowly confining relief to enforcement of existing approvals and regulatory prerequisites, while expressly leaving substantive contractual and registration issues (e.g., validity of the 30-year lease under Section 92) for the pending civil appeal, the Court avoided overstepping into the appellate domain, yet ensured that administrative inaction does not render judicial protection illusory. The ruling serves as a check against misuse of administrative discretion to indirectly nullify court orders, promotes consistency in local governance, and safeguards investments in essential public utilities leased through transparent processes, all while preserving the appellate court’s prerogative on ultimate merits.