THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER & OTHERS V. S. LALITHA & OTHERS 2025 INSC 565

DATE: 24/05/2025

COURT: Supreme Court of India

BENCH: Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Rajesh Bindal

FACTS:

The respondent in this case was appointed as a TV News and Film Librarian (Library & Information Assistant) at Doordarshan Kendra, Bangalore, on 11th March 1985. She was first granted the benefit of financial upgradation under the Assured Career Progression (ACP) Scheme, 1999, with effect from 9th August 1999. As the ACP Scheme provided for financial upgradation after 12 and 24 years of service, she became eligible for the second upgradation from 11th March 2009. However, before this could be implemented, the ACP Scheme was superseded by the Modified Assured Career Progression (MACP) Scheme on 19th May 2009, which provided for financial upgradation on completion of 10, 20, and 30 years of service, with placement in the next higher grade pay, and certain benefits under the ACP scheme were to be ignored due to pay scale mergers. Accordingly, she was granted second and third financial upgradations under the MACP Scheme—first on 1st September 2008 with Grade Pay of Rs. 4,800/- and later on 11th July 2015 with Grade Pay of Rs. 5,400/-—both of which she accepted without any objection.

Subsequently, on 4th October 2016, the respondent submitted a representation seeking the second financial upgradation under the ACP Scheme (instead of the MACP Scheme) with Grade Pay of Rs. 6,600/- from 11th March 2009 and the third upgradation under the MACP Scheme with Grade Pay of Rs. 7,600/- from 11th March 2015. This representation was rejected by the Deputy Director on 5th November 2016. Aggrieved, she approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Bengaluru, which allowed her original application and directed the authorities to grant the requested benefits. The appellants challenged this decision before the High Court of Karnataka, which dismissed the writ petition and affirmed the Tribunal’s order. The appellants then approached the Supreme Court challenging the High Court’s decision.

ISSUES:

The key issues in this case revolve around whether the respondent, after having accepted financial upgradations under the Modified Assured Career Progression (MACP) Scheme without objection, was entitled to subsequently claim the benefits of the earlier Assured Career Progression (ACP) Scheme for a higher grade pay. The case also questioned the validity of the Tribunal’s and High Court’s decisions granting her those enhanced benefits, and whether such retrospective claims were legally sustainable. Finally, the issue arose as to whether the surplus financial benefits already received by the respondent following her retirement should be recovered, considering her age, financial needs, and the constitutional provisions under Articles 15(3), 41, and 142 that support social justice and dignity for women and the elderly.

JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:

The Supreme Court disposed of the appeal without interfering with the impugned order of the High Court and the Tribunal, despite holding that the Original Application filed by the respondent was time-barred and ought not to have been entertained. Considering the respondent’s retirement in 2018, her financial condition, and invoking its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court refrained from directing her to refund any excess financial benefits received under the Tribunal’s order.

The Court held that the respondent's Original Application (O.A.) before the Central Administrative Tribunal was clearly barred by limitation under Sections 20 and 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. It emphasized that although limitation laws do not typically apply to writ jurisdiction, they do apply to service disputes under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The respondent received benefits under the MACP Scheme in 2010 and 2015 without protest but raised a grievance only in October 2016 through a belated representation. The Court clarified that mere submission of a delayed representation cannot extend or defer the limitation period for filing an O.A., unless the service rules specifically allow for such representations or the situation involves a continuous wrong. The respondent's inaction in promptly availing of legal remedies rendered her claim legally unsustainable.

Despite these procedural infirmities, the Court exercised its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice. It took into account that the respondent, a retired woman employee, had already benefited from the implementation of the Tribunal's order and was now in the later years of her life. The Court stressed the importance of financial support for retired individuals to live a life of dignity and referenced Articles 15(3) and 41 of the Constitution, which empower the State to make special provisions for women and guide it to support the elderly. In light of these constitutional values and humanitarian considerations, the Court chose not to order recovery of the excess amount paid to the respondent, treating the case as a special exception in the interest of justice.

ANALYSIS:

This case highlights the conflict between procedural rigor and equitable justice in service law disputes. The respondent, after accepting financial upgradations under the MACP Scheme without objection, later claimed benefits under the superseded ACP Scheme, seeking a higher grade pay. Legally, the Supreme Court found merit in the appellants' argument that the respondent's claim was time-barred under Sections 20 and 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The Court made it clear that service matters adjudicated under the Tribunal must follow the statutory timelines, and filing a belated representation does not extend or revive a stale cause of action. The Court emphasized that although administrative remedies may exist, their invocation must be timely to sustain a valid claim before the Tribunal.

Despite the procedural lapse, the Court’s use of Article 142 reflects a humanitarian approach to justice. It recognized the respondent’s advanced age, retirement status, and financial vulnerability, invoking constitutional values under Articles 15(3) and 41 to protect her dignity and well-being. Rather than ordering recovery of the surplus benefits she received following the Tribunal’s directions, the Court treated this as a “very special case” deserving compassionate consideration. This analysis demonstrates how the judiciary can uphold legal principles while still allowing room for flexibility to ensure that justice is not only done but seen to be done in cases involving marginalized or elderly individuals.