THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI VS. MUKESH & ANR CRL.REV.P. 143/2018:

DATE: 18/07/2025

COURT: High Court of Delhi

BENCH: Justice Girish Kathpalia

FACTS:

Respondent No. 1, along with Respondent No. 2, who is his wife, has been implicated in serious allegations involving the prosecutrix. It is alleged that Respondent No. 1 entrapped the prosecutrix by luring her with sweet talk and making false promises of marriage. He allegedly convinced her that he would marry her after obtaining a divorce from his wife, Respondent No. 2. On the false assurance of marriage, Respondent No. 1 is said to have established physical relations with the prosecutrix on multiple occasions.

The situation escalated when the prosecutrix went to the residence of the Respondents to discuss her proposed marriage with Respondent No. 1. At that point, both Respondents allegedly assaulted her and wrongfully confined her within their home. Furthermore, they are accused of threatening the prosecutrix with the possibility of implicating her in a false criminal case. Subsequently, the Respondents called the Police Control Room (PCR), following which all parties were taken to the police station.

Based on the prosecutrix’s account of the incident provided at the police station, a First Information Report (FIR) was registered against the Respondents for offences under Sections 376 and 377 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Upon completion of the investigation, the police filed a chargesheet against the Respondents under Sections 376, 377, 323, 342, and 34 of the IPC, along with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. Following this, the Trial Court examined the materials on record and passed the impugned order. It held that a prima facie case had been made out against Respondent No. 1 under Sections 376(2) and 377 of the IPC, as well as under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. Accordingly, charges were formally framed against Respondent No. 1 for these offences. However, in the case of Respondent No. 2, the Court found that no offence was made out against her based on the available evidence and, therefore, she was discharged from the proceedings.

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ISSUES:

The key issue before the Court was whether the Trial Court erred in discharging the respondents from offences under Sections 323 (voluntarily causing hurt), 342 (wrongful confinement), and 34 (common intention) of the Indian Penal Code, despite the specific allegations made by the prosecutrix in the FIR. The State contended that a prima facie case for these offences was made out at the stage of framing charges, and that the learned Magistrate had wrongly concluded otherwise by placing undue reliance on the medical report (MLC) alone.

JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:

The Delhi High Court allowed the revision petition and set aside the Trial Court’s order that discharged the respondents from offences under Sections 323, 342, and 34 IPC. The matter was remanded to the Trial Court for fresh consideration on these aspects. Both respondents were directed to appear before the Trial Court on the specified date for further proceedings.

The Court held that at the stage of framing charges, the trial court is not required to conduct a meticulous evaluation of the evidence but must only determine whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding based on prima facie material. In this case, the prosecutrix had clearly alleged in her FIR and in her Section 164 CrPC statement that both respondents beat her, delivering blows to her abdomen and striking her head against a wall. The absence of visible injuries in the medical examination (MLC) was not, in the Court’s view, a valid reason to discard these allegations at the stage of charge. The Court emphasized that whether or not such physical acts resulted in noticeable injuries is a matter to be evaluated during trial, and their absence cannot nullify the prosecutrix's explicit claims of being beaten.

Regarding the allegation of wrongful confinement under Section 342 IPC, the Court found the prosecutrix's statement—that she was confined in the respondents’ house—to be clear and explicit. It rejected the trial court’s reasoning that wrongful confinement could only be established if the victim’s hands were tied, calling this interpretation misconceived. The High Court clarified that wrongful confinement does not require physical restraint like tying up; it is sufficient if a person is prevented from moving freely, such as being forcibly kept in a room. The Court further held that the involvement of both respondents and their common intention could be reasonably inferred from the sequence of events narrated in the FIR, even in the absence of explicit use of the term "common intention."

ANALYSIS:

This case underscores the principle that at the stage of framing charges, the court’s role is limited to determining whether there exists a prima facie case to proceed with trial, rather than conducting an in-depth assessment of the evidence. The Delhi High Court rightly noted that the prosecutrix’s clear and consistent allegations in both her FIR and Section 164 CrPC statement, regarding physical assault and wrongful confinement by both respondents, could not be dismissed solely based on the absence of injuries in the medical examination. The Court reaffirmed that visible injuries are not a prerequisite to establish an offence under Section 323 IPC, and that such nuances should be explored during the trial, not at the stage of charge framing.

Furthermore, the Court took a strong stance on the improper interpretation of wrongful confinement by the Trial Court. It clarified that confinement under Section 342 IPC does not necessitate overt physical restraint such as tying up the victim. Preventing someone from leaving a place against their will is sufficient. Importantly, the High Court also acknowledged the principle of common intention under Section 34 IPC, holding that it can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the incident, even if not explicitly stated in the FIR. By setting aside the discharge order and remanding the matter for fresh consideration, the Court reinforced the importance of applying legal standards appropriately at the charge-framing stage to ensure the prosecutrix’s allegations are given due judicial scrutiny.