VI-JOHN HEALTHCARE INDIA LLP V. DABUR INDIA LIMITED 2025:DHC:6269:

DATE: 31/07/2025

COURT: High Court of Delhi

BENCH: Justice Tejas Karia

FACTS:

The present dispute stems from a civil suit filed by the Respondent before the Trial Court, alleging trademark and copyright infringement, passing off, and seeking damages amounting to Rs.2,50,000 against the Petitioner. The Respondent’s grievance centred around the Petitioner’s use of similar packaging and the descriptive use of the term “MISWAK” on its product packaging, which was claimed to be infringing. Summons were served on the Petitioner, and on the date fixed for appearance, the Trial Court passed the first impugned order. This order stated that any delay in filing the Written Statement or Replication would be condoned only upon payment of a cost of Rs.25,000 for each day of delay. Subsequently, a second impugned order was passed, whereby the Trial Court imposed costs on the Petitioner in line with the earlier directive.

In response, the Petitioner referred to various orders passed by the High Court in comparable intellectual property rights (IPR) suits, particularly in cases where the damages claimed exceeded Rs.2,00,00,000. In those instances, the costs imposed for condonation of delay in filing written statements were significantly lower, typically in the range of Rs.5,000 to Rs.10,000. The Petitioner argued that despite citing these precedents and making detailed submissions to that effect, the Trial Court permitted the application only upon payment of Rs.25,000 per day for the 48 days of delay, resulting in a total cost of Rs.12,00,000. The Petitioner contended that the amount imposed was excessive and disproportionate in light of the lower claim value and the established judicial trend in similar matters.

ISSUES:

The primary issue in this case was whether the imposition of Rs.25,000 per day for a 48-day delay in filing the Written Statement totalling Rs.12,00,000 was justified and proportionate in a suit where the relief sought was damages of only Rs.2,50,000. The Petitioner challenged the validity of two impugned orders passed by the Trial Court: the first, which pre-emptively warned of such costs in the event of delay, and the second, which enforced that warning without considering the Petitioner's explanations or the circumstances that led to the delay.

JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:

The High Court set aside both the First and Second Impugned Orders, specifically to the extent they related to the imposition of cost for the delayed filing of the Written Statement. The Court allowed the Petition and directed that the Written Statement be taken on record without any cost imposed on the Petitioner. It held that the delay of 48 days was within the legally permissible limit of 120 days and sufficiently justified.

The Court held that the Trial Court had erred in treating the First Impugned Order, issued on the date of first appearance when no delay had even occurred as binding and final without allowing room for consideration of subsequent developments. The First Order was merely precautionary in nature and intended to encourage timely filing, not to impose a penalty. Importantly, the Trial Court failed to independently evaluate the Petitioner's submissions, which included references to High Court precedents in similar IPR cases with much higher claims but significantly lower costs imposed for delays. Additionally, the Court emphasized that any application must be assessed on its own merit, and a prior cautionary order should not automatically bind the court, especially when conditions have changed or new facts have emerged.

The Court also observed that the Trial Court disregarded relevant facts such as the parties actively exploring an amicable settlement, which was recorded in both its own orders and those of the Saket Court. Furthermore, the Respondent had neither filed a reply nor raised any serious objection to the condonation application. In such circumstances, the imposition of Rs.12,00,000 as a cost was grossly disproportionate to the relief of Rs.2,50,000 sought in the suit. The Court stressed that judicial discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably, especially where no prejudice is caused to the other party. It reiterated that encouraging settlement efforts should be a priority, and in this instance, the Petitioner's reasons for delay were justified and ought to have been considered with due sensitivity.

ANALYSIS:

This case highlights the importance of judicial proportionality and discretion in procedural matters, especially within the framework of intellectual property rights (IPR) litigation. The core legal question revolved around whether a Trial Court could enforce a steep cost of Rs.25,000 per day for delay in filing a Written Statement, totaling Rs.12,00,000, in a suit where the relief claimed was only Rs.2,50,000. The High Court rightly emphasized that procedural directions such as those in the First Impugned Order should not be treated as rigid mandates when they are precautionary in nature and issued before any actual delay occurs. The decision underlines that courts must distinguish between deterrent warnings and binding judicial directions, and must re-evaluate earlier orders if new facts or justifiable grounds arise. In this case, the unexplored and unreasoned enforcement of the prior order resulted in a penalty that was clearly excessive and disproportionate to the claim.

Furthermore, the judgment underscores the necessity for courts to adopt a pragmatic and context-sensitive approach when exercising discretion on procedural defaults. The High Court found that the Trial Court failed to consider essential factors such as the parties’ genuine attempts at amicable settlement, absence of any real opposition by the Respondent, and the Petitioner’s reliance on established judicial precedents showing lower costs in higher-stake suits. It reiterated that applications for condonation of delay must be examined on their own merits and not summarily rejected based on prior procedural cautions. The judgment serves as a reminder that procedural flexibility must be preserved to avoid injustice, especially when such rigid enforcement creates a barrier to fair adjudication. It also affirms that the judiciary must encourage conciliatory efforts, rather than penalize them indirectly through disproportionate cost burdens.