BENCH: Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice A.C. Gupta, Justice N.L. Untwalia, Justice P.S. Kailasam, and Justice S. Murtaza Fazal Ali.
FACTS:
This case emerged from a legal conflict concerning constitutional amendments, judicial review, and the Ninth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. Following India's independence, the government introduced several land reform laws aimed at redistributing land to reduce economic disparity and promote social justice. However, these laws were frequently challenged in courts for violating fundamental rights, particularly the right to property under Article 31 and the right to equality under Article 14. To prevent judicial interference, the First Amendment to the Constitution was enacted in 1951, creating the Ninth Schedule, which granted immunity to certain laws from judicial review. Over time, more laws were added to the Ninth Schedule, shielding them from legal scrutiny despite concerns that some of them violated fundamental rights.
The extent of Parliament's power to amend the Constitution, including its ability to limit fundamental rights, became a subject of legal debate. In Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967), the Supreme Court ruled that Parliament could not amend fundamental rights, leading the government to enact the Twenty-Fourth, Twenty-Fifth, and Twenty-Ninth Amendments to assert its authority over constitutional amendments. This conflict escalated to the landmark Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) case, in which the Supreme Court ruled that while Parliament had the power to amend the Constitution, it could not alter its basic structure. This doctrine placed restrictions on the government's ability to amend fundamental constitutional principles, ensuring that any amendment must preserve the core framework of the Constitution.
Despite the ruling in Kesavananda Bharati, Parliament continued to add laws to the Ninth Schedule, raising concerns that this was being used as a means to bypass judicial review. The petitioners in Waman Rao challenged certain land reform laws in Maharashtra that had been placed under the Ninth Schedule, arguing that constitutional amendments made after the Kesavananda Bharati judgment should not enjoy automatic immunity. They contended that such amendments must still be subject to judicial review to determine whether they violated the basic structure of the Constitution. This legal challenge led to the Supreme Court re-examining the scope of the Ninth Schedule and deciding whether laws placed under it after April 24, 1973 (the date of the Kesavananda Bharati judgment), could still be scrutinized by courts.
ISSUES:
The case primarily revolved around two major legal issues. First, whether constitutional amendments made after Kesavananda Bharati that placed laws in the Ninth Schedule could still be challenged on the grounds of violating the basic structure of the Constitution. Second, whether laws inserted into the Ninth Schedule before the Kesavananda Bharati judgment should also be open to judicial review if they violated fundamental rights.
JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:
The Supreme Court, in its ruling, upheld the doctrine of the basic structure as established in Kesavananda Bharati. It held that constitutional amendments made after April 24, 1973 (the date of the Kesavananda Bharati judgment), that sought to place laws in the Ninth Schedule, would be subject to judicial review.
The Supreme Court provided a detailed reasoning for its decision, primarily relying on the basic structure doctrine established in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973). The court examined the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution, the purpose of the Ninth Schedule, and the necessity of judicial review in protecting fundamental rights.
The court reasoned that while Parliament has the authority to amend the Constitution, including placing laws under the Ninth Schedule, this power is not absolute. Any amendment that violates or destroys the basic structure of the Constitution would be considered unconstitutional. The court emphasized that judicial review is a fundamental aspect of the Constitution’s basic structure and cannot be taken away entirely, even by amending the Constitution. This meant that laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973, could be challenged in court if they were found to violate fundamental rights in a manner that threatened the basic structure of the Constitution.
To maintain legal certainty and stability, the court also held that laws inserted into the Ninth Schedule before the Kesavananda Bharati judgment (April 24, 1973) would remain valid and immune from judicial review. This decision created a clear cut-off date, ensuring that past laws would not be subjected to retrospective scrutiny while preventing future amendments from escaping judicial review indefinitely.
The court justified this approach by balancing parliamentary supremacy and constitutional supremacy. It acknowledged that Parliament must have the power to make laws and implement reforms, especially for social and economic justice. However, it also stressed that these powers should not override the fundamental principles of the Constitution. By allowing judicial review of post-Kesavananda Bharati amendments, the court ensured that fundamental rights were protected from arbitrary changes while still upholding previously enacted laws under the Ninth Schedule.
Overall, the reasoning in Waman Rao reinforced the judiciary’s role as the guardian of the Constitution, preventing Parliament from using the Ninth Schedule as a means to bypass judicial scrutiny and violate fundamental rights. This judgment further solidified the basic structure doctrine, ensuring that constitutional amendments must always conform to the core principles of democracy, rule of law, and fundamental rights.
ANALYSIS:
The Waman Rao decision reinforced the significance of the basic structure doctrine and judicial review in India’s constitutional framework. It struck a balance between parliamentary supremacy and constitutional supremacy, ensuring that while Parliament had the power to amend the Constitution, it could not do so in a way that undermined its core principles. By setting April 24, 1973, as the cut-off date, the court provided clarity on the retrospective application of the doctrine, thereby protecting past legislation from unnecessary litigation while preserving the integrity of future constitutional amendments. This judgment also reaffirmed the role of the judiciary in acting as a guardian of the Constitution, ensuring that fundamental rights were not arbitrarily curtailed under the guise of constitutional amendments.
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