AJMER DARGAH BLAST CASE: SUPREME COURT ISSUES NOTICE ON KHADIM’S PETITION CHALLENGING ACQUITTAL OF SEVEN ACCUSED:

The Supreme Court on October 3 issued notice to the State of Rajasthan in response to a special leave petition filed by Syed Sarwar Chishty, Khadim of Dargah Sharif, Ajmer. The petition challenges the Rajasthan High Court’s dismissal of an appeal against the acquittal of seven accused in the 2007 Ajmer Dargah bomb blast case. The notice was issued by a bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Sandeep Mehta, seeking the State’s response to the contentions raised by the complainant.

The 2007 Ajmer Dargah blast, which occurred during evening prayers at the revered shrine, had led to multiple casualties and injuries, sparking a nationwide investigation into the involvement of extremist groups. The case was subsequently taken over by the National Investigation Agency (NIA). On March 8, 2017, the Special Judge for NIA Cases delivered the verdict, convicting two accused namely Devendra Gupta and Bhavesh Patel, while acquitting seven others. The acquitted persons were identified as Lokesh Sharma, Chandrashekhar Leve, Mukesh Vasani, Harshad alias Munna alias Raj, Nabakumar Sarkar alias Swami Aseemanand, Mafat alias Mehul, and Bharat Mohanlal Rateshwar.

Devendra Gupta and Bhavesh Patel were convicted under Sections 120B (criminal conspiracy) and 295A (deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings) of the Indian Penal Code, along with provisions of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The complainant and the prosecution, aggrieved by the acquittal of the other seven accused, filed an appeal before the Rajasthan High Court on June 1, 2017. However, the appeal was not taken up for consideration until 2022, and it was eventually dismissed on May 4, 2022.

The High Court’s dismissal was based on the interpretation of Section 21(5) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, which prescribes a limitation period of 90 days for filing appeals. The Court held that the petitioner’s delay of 1,135 days could not be condoned, emphasizing that the provision imposed an absolute bar on entertaining appeals beyond this period.

Challenging this interpretation, the petitioner has contended before the Supreme Court that a rigid reading of Section 21(5) violates the constitutional guarantees of equality and the right to life under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The plea argues that denying the right to appeal based solely on procedural delay deprives victims and complainants of their access to justice and an effective remedy. It asserts that the High Court’s approach undermines the principle that procedural rules should serve the cause of justice rather than restrict it.

The petition further argues that such a strict limitation discriminates between cases investigated by the NIA and those handled by other investigative agencies, where courts have greater flexibility to condone delays. It emphasizes that the legislature did not intend for Section 21(5) to create an arbitrary distinction that curtails victims’ rights in serious offences such as terrorism.

In support of this contention, the petitioner has relied on judicial precedents such as Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Mohd. Abaad Ali v. Directorate of Revenue Prosecution Intelligence, where the Supreme Court underscored that the right to appeal forms an integral component of the right to a fair trial under Article 21. The petition asserts that justice cannot be sacrificed at the altar of technicalities, especially in matters involving grave public concern.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court has now issued notice to the State of Rajasthan, calling for its response on the petitioner’s challenge to the High Court’s interpretation of the NIA Act. The outcome of this case may have significant implications for the procedural rights of victims and complainants in terrorism-related trials and appeals.