DELHI HIGH COURT: DEMAND DOESN’T STOP BEING DOWRY DEMAND MERELY BECAUSE PURPOSE IS CLAIMED AS “BUSINESS” INSTEAD OF PERSONAL USE:

The Delhi High Court has upheld the conviction of a husband and his brother for the dowry death of a young woman, a case that remained pending for 22 years. The Court ruled that a demand for money continues to qualify as a dowry demand even when a witness describes it as intended for starting a business, provided the demand remains linked to the marital relationship. The Bench affirmed the Trial Court’s application of the settled legal position that Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code does not require proof of any final agreement to pay dowry; the mere existence of a demand is enough to bring the provision into play. It rejected the argument that an explanation offered by one witness about the purpose of the demand weakened the prosecution’s case.

Justice Vimal Kumar Yadav, sitting as a Single Judge, observed that the circumstance in which a prosecution witness linked the demand to setting up a business does not remove it from the definition of dowry. A demand connected with the marital relationship does not lose its character merely because the stated purpose is business rather than personal use. The Trial Court correctly relied on the principle that Section 304-B requires only a demand and not a concluded agreement, and that finding needed no interference. Advocate Dharmendra Vashishtha represented the appellants while Mukesh Kumar, Additional Public Prosecutor, appeared for the State.

According to the prosecution, the deceased married Naveen Kumar Verma on 29 November 2002. On 10 April 2003, barely four and a half months later, she was found hanging from a ceiling fan in the matrimonial home at Tughlakabad. The following day her father stated before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate that Naveen and his brother Ajay Kumar Verma used to beat her and demand Rs 50,000 as dowry; he also implicated their mother. An FIR was registered under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 34 of the IPC. After trial the two brothers were convicted and sentenced to ten years’ and three years’ rigorous imprisonment respectively, while their mother was given the benefit of doubt and acquitted.

Before the High Court the appellants argued that all prosecution witnesses were close relatives of the deceased and therefore interested. They pointed out that a mediator of the marriage had described the couple as living happily, and claimed that an alleged telephonic distress call made two days before the death was a material improvement introduced only at the trial stage. They further contended that the admission by one witness that the Rs 50,000 demand was linked to starting a business took the demand outside the scope of dowry.

The Court rejected these submissions. It held that a related witness is not automatically an interested witness, especially when the alleged cruelty takes place inside the matrimonial home and family members are the natural persons to whom the victim would complain. On the business-purpose explanation, the Court reiterated that a demand connected with the marital relationship retains its character as a dowry demand irrespective of whether the disclosed purpose is business or personal use. It also affirmed that Section 304-B is attracted by a demand alone.

Applying the “soon before death” proximity test, the Court noted that even on the appellants’ own version an interval of a little over three months between the start of harassment and the death satisfied the requirement of proximity. This triggered the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The appellants failed to rebut that presumption; their plea of alibi remained unsubstantiated and their suggestion of an illicit relationship on the part of the deceased was an afterthought never put to the prosecution witnesses.

Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal, sustained the conviction and sentence in full, and directed the appellants to surrender forthwith to serve the remaining portion of their sentence, subject to the set-off already granted under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.