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    The Rajasthan High Court has ruled that the law of criminal contempt is not intended to safeguard the personal prestige or ego of a presiding judicial officer. Personal criticism or allegations directed at an individual judge do not ordinarily amount to criminal contempt, unless they interfere with the administration of justice or scandalise the court as an institution.

    A Division Bench comprising Justice Farjand Ali and Justice Yogendra Kumar Purohit made this observation while dismissing a criminal contempt reference against certain police officials. The case arose from statements made by the officials during an official inquiry ordered by a subordinate court into alleged lapses in a criminal investigation.

    The contempt proceedings originated when a presiding officer of a lower court referred the matter, alleging that the police officials had committed criminal contempt through their remarks recorded during an inquiry conducted by the Additional Superintendent of Police. This inquiry had been initiated following judicial directions to examine alleged police lapses. In their statements, the officials expressed certain grievances and made allegations regarding the conduct of the presiding officer.

    The High Court carefully examined whether such statements, made in response to questions posed by a superior officer in an official inquiry, could qualify as criminal contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

    The Bench clarified the scope of criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Act. It emphasised that the law focuses on acts that scandalise the court, interfere with judicial proceedings, or obstruct the administration of justice. The concern of the law is not the personal feelings or reputation of the individual officer presiding over the bench. Instead, it aims to protect the dignity, authority, and orderly functioning of the court as an institution.

    The Court stressed that contempt jurisdiction is exceptional and must be exercised with great restraint. It requires balancing judicial dignity with the fundamental right to freedom of expression. A clear distinction must be drawn between criticism of an individual judicial officer and an attack on the judiciary as an institution. An individual may be criticised for his or her conduct without it automatically being treated as criticism of the court or its judgments. The judiciary draws its strength from public confidence, which is better strengthened through fair examination of genuine complaints rather than by suppressing grievances.

    A crucial aspect in this case was the context of the statements. They were not made in any public forum or publication, nor were they intended to scandalise the judiciary. Instead, they were recorded privately during an official inquiry process. The statements were explanatory in nature and confined to the inquiry, without any element of publication that is typically required for criminal contempt. The Bench noted that a person who perceives improper behaviour or humiliation cannot be expected to remain silent, especially when narrating facts truthfully before a competent authority conducting an inquiry.

    The Court referred to the protection available under Section 6 of the Contempt of Courts Act for complaints made in good faith against presiding officers of subordinate courts. Treating such grievances as contempt would defeat the purpose of institutional accountability mechanisms. If merely submitting a complaint about a presiding officer’s conduct were to be viewed as criminal contempt, the entire vigilance and grievance redressal system would become ineffective. Such an approach would create a chilling effect, discouraging people from raising legitimate concerns and undermining fairness, transparency, and accountability in the justice system.

    The Bench concluded that the statements in question did not interfere with any judicial proceedings, obstruct the administration of justice, or challenge the authority of the court. They did not amount to deliberate vilification or an attack on the institution of justice. Criminal contempt jurisdiction is not meant to silence grievances or shield judicial officers from criticism, unless the criticism crosses into scandalising the court itself. Fair criticism made in good faith and through proper channels forms an essential part of a transparent and accountable justice delivery system.

    Accordingly, the Rajasthan High Court held that the statements by the police officials did not meet the ingredients of criminal contempt. The contempt reference was dismissed in full.

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