The Rajasthan High Court has ruled that the law of criminal
contempt is not intended to safeguard the personal prestige or ego of a
presiding judicial officer. Personal criticism or allegations directed at an
individual judge do not ordinarily amount to criminal contempt, unless they
interfere with the administration of justice or scandalise the court as an
institution.
A Division Bench comprising Justice Farjand Ali and Justice
Yogendra Kumar Purohit made this observation while dismissing a criminal contempt
reference against certain police officials. The case arose from statements made
by the officials during an official inquiry ordered by a subordinate court into
alleged lapses in a criminal investigation.
The contempt proceedings originated when a presiding officer
of a lower court referred the matter, alleging that the police officials had
committed criminal contempt through their remarks recorded during an inquiry
conducted by the Additional Superintendent of Police. This inquiry had been
initiated following judicial directions to examine alleged police lapses. In
their statements, the officials expressed certain grievances and made
allegations regarding the conduct of the presiding officer.
The High Court carefully examined whether such statements,
made in response to questions posed by a superior officer in an official
inquiry, could qualify as criminal contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971.
The Bench clarified the scope of criminal contempt under
Section 2(c) of the Act. It emphasised that the law focuses on acts that
scandalise the court, interfere with judicial proceedings, or obstruct the
administration of justice. The concern of the law is not the personal feelings
or reputation of the individual officer presiding over the bench. Instead, it
aims to protect the dignity, authority, and orderly functioning of the court as
an institution.
The Court stressed that contempt jurisdiction is exceptional
and must be exercised with great restraint. It requires balancing judicial
dignity with the fundamental right to freedom of expression. A clear
distinction must be drawn between criticism of an individual judicial officer
and an attack on the judiciary as an institution. An individual may be
criticised for his or her conduct without it automatically being treated as
criticism of the court or its judgments. The judiciary draws its strength from
public confidence, which is better strengthened through fair examination of
genuine complaints rather than by suppressing grievances.
A crucial aspect in this case was the context of the
statements. They were not made in any public forum or publication, nor were
they intended to scandalise the judiciary. Instead, they were recorded
privately during an official inquiry process. The statements were explanatory
in nature and confined to the inquiry, without any element of publication that
is typically required for criminal contempt. The Bench noted that a person who
perceives improper behaviour or humiliation cannot be expected to remain
silent, especially when narrating facts truthfully before a competent authority
conducting an inquiry.
The Court referred to the protection available under Section
6 of the Contempt of Courts Act for complaints made in good faith against
presiding officers of subordinate courts. Treating such grievances as contempt
would defeat the purpose of institutional accountability mechanisms. If merely
submitting a complaint about a presiding officer’s conduct were to be viewed as
criminal contempt, the entire vigilance and grievance redressal system would
become ineffective. Such an approach would create a chilling effect,
discouraging people from raising legitimate concerns and undermining fairness,
transparency, and accountability in the justice system.
The Bench concluded that the statements in question did not
interfere with any judicial proceedings, obstruct the administration of
justice, or challenge the authority of the court. They did not amount to
deliberate vilification or an attack on the institution of justice. Criminal
contempt jurisdiction is not meant to silence grievances or shield judicial
officers from criticism, unless the criticism crosses into scandalising the
court itself. Fair criticism made in good faith and through proper channels
forms an essential part of a transparent and accountable justice delivery
system.
Accordingly, the Rajasthan High Court held that the
statements by the police officials did not meet the ingredients of criminal
contempt. The contempt reference was dismissed in full.