SC: ANTI-MOB VIOLENCE DIRECTIVES BINDING, DISPOSES PIL ON COW VIGILANTISM:

SC: ANTI-MOB VIOLENCE DIRECTIVES BINDING, DISPOSES PIL ON COW VIGILANTISM:

Emphasizing that directions against lynching and mob violence had already been issued, the Supreme Court on February 11 dismissed a PIL concerning cow vigilantism and mob attacks.

The Court reaffirmed that the guidelines set forth in its 2018 Tehseen Poonawalla judgment are binding on all authorities. It further stated that monitoring compliance across all States and Union Territories from Delhi was not practical. Additionally, the Court observed that the petition’s prayers were broad and general in nature.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:

In its PIL, NFIW urged the Supreme Court to issue a mandamus directing authorities to take immediate action in line with the findings and directions of the Tehseen Poonawalla judgment to address the growing issue of lynching and mob violence. The petition cited several incidents, including the lynching of two Muslims suspected of smuggling beef in Bihar's Saran and Maharashtra’s Nashik, an alleged assault by Bajrang Dal on a Muslim daily wage worker transporting two cows, the violent attack, illegal detention, and humiliation of two Muslim men by a mob in Bhubaneswar, Odisha, and an attack on a bus carrying Hajj pilgrims by a violent mob in Kota, Rajasthan.

NFIW further alleged that the State machinery had consistently failed to take adequate preventive and corrective measures to curb lynching and mob violence, despite the Supreme Court’s ruling that the State has a "sacrosanct duty" to protect citizens from "unruly elements" and "perpetrators of orchestrated lynching and vigilantism."

The petitioner also contended that mob lynching and cow vigilantism were fueled by false propaganda against minorities, spread through public events, social media, news channels, and films.

In addition to seeking a writ of mandamus for enforcing the Tehseen Poonawalla guidelines, NFIW also requested immediate relief for lynching victims, urging that a portion of the total compensation amount be granted to victims or their families as "interim compensation" immediately after the incident.

THE COURT’S OPINION:

A bench comprising Justices B.R. Gavai and K. Vinod Chandran issued the order, stating:

“Second prayer is with regard to providing redressal in the cases of lynching and mob violence mentioned hereinabove to the victims and their families...a strict compliance with the punitive and remedial measures mentioned in para 14 of the Tehseen Poonawalla judgment. Insofar as the said prayer clause is concerned, again, if there is non-compliance with the directions issued by this Court in Tehseen Poonawalla, an aggrieved person would have a remedy available to him in law. However, sitting here in Delhi, we can't monitor incidents taking place in different areas in different states of country. In our view, such micromanagement by this Court would not be feasible. If any other person is aggrieved with the directions, they can approach competent courts for redressal of their grievance in accordance with law”

Regarding the petitioner’s request for a writ of mandamus directing the respondent authorities to act in accordance with the Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India judgment, the Court stated that since directions had already been issued, they are binding on all authorities under Article 141 of the Constitution. Therefore, every authority is obligated to comply with the guidelines set forth in Tehseen Poonawalla.

As for the petitioner’s plea for a "minimum uniform amount" as compensation for victims of mob lynching, the Court observed that the appropriate compensation would vary depending on the circumstances of each case. It noted that granting the same compensation to individuals with minor injuries and those suffering grievous harm would be impractical. Consequently, the Court held that no uniform directive on compensation could be issued to the authorities.

"Doing so would be taking away discretion available to the Courts or the authorities in determination of compensation...A direction to pay uniform compensation would be unjust...We find that petition seeking such omnibus reliefs would neither be in interest of victims", the Court opined.

Regarding the petitioner’s challenge to the validity of 13 state enactments and notifications that allegedly granted police powers—such as entering premises and seizing vehicles—to private individuals or organizations for monitoring cattle smuggling, the Court opined that aggrieved individuals should approach the respective jurisdictional High Courts to contest the validity or constitutionality of these notifications.