SC RESERVES JUDGMENT ON TN MINISTER'S PLEA IN LAND GRAB CASE; TO DECIDE IF PRIOR SANCTION NEEDED FOR PROSECUTION OVER ACTS IN FORMER OFFICE:

On July 23, the Supreme Court reserved its verdict in a plea filed by Tamil Nadu Health Minister Ma. Subramanian and his wife, challenging a Madras High Court decision that had refused to quash a chargesheet against them in a land grabbing case. The charges relate to the alleged illegal acquisition of government land in Guindy, Chennai, during Subramanian’s tenure as the Mayor of Chennai. The case raises a significant legal question, whether sanction to prosecute is required for an offence allegedly committed by a public servant in a previous office, when cognizance of the offence is taken after the individual has vacated that office and holds a different public position.

The petition was heard by a bench comprising Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and Aravind Kumar. The case involves a special leave petition against the March 28 order of the Madras High Court that allowed the trial to commence based on a 2019 chargesheet. The petitioners had sought to quash the chargesheet on the grounds that prosecuting a sitting Minister for acts allegedly committed in a previous office without appropriate sanction violated procedural safeguards.

Representing the State of Tamil Nadu, the Counsel argued that Subramanian was no longer serving as Mayor when the chargesheet was filed, and hence, no sanction was required under law. The State maintained that although Subramanian is currently a Minister, the alleged offence is linked solely to his conduct during his previous role as Mayor. Since he ceased to hold that particular office at the time cognizance was taken, the requirement for sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act did not apply.

Senior Advocate Mukul Rohatgi, appearing for Subramanian, opposed this stance. He contended that because Subramanian is presently a public servant holding ministerial office, prosecution should still require sanction. Rohatgi argued that the authority competent to remove Subramanian from the office he held at the time of the alleged offence—the Mayor—would be the appropriate sanctioning authority. Drawing an analogy, he said a public servant might hold various roles over time, such as being an MLA earlier and later an MP, and different authorities would have jurisdiction over their actions depending on the role held at the time of the alleged misconduct. He questioned whether the current Speaker of the Lok Sabha could grant sanction for an offence committed when the person was an MLA a decade ago.

In response, the Tamil Nadu Counsel firmly reiterated the State’s position that sanction was unnecessary since the office from which Subramanian is alleged to have misused his power had already been vacated before the chargesheet was filed.

Justice Dhulia engaged with the arguments, pointing out that the legal issue at hand could fall within a “grey area.” Referring to precedents cited during the hearing, including the Supreme Court's decision in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay (1984) in which Justice Dhulia noted that existing judgments envisage scenarios where a public servant no longer holds the office in which the alleged misconduct occurred. In such situations, he suggested, sanction may not be necessary—even if the person now holds a different public office.

When Rohatgi countered that the cited judgments might not be entirely applicable, especially where the definition of a public servant was in question, the bench clarified that the key factor was the timing. Subramanian had already left the office of Mayor at the time of filing the chargesheet and, therefore, under prevailing interpretations, sanction was not required, even though he currently holds a ministerial role.

Justice Kumar summed up the legal position by stating that the essence of the State’s argument was that because Subramanian misused his office as Mayor and no longer held that position when cognizance was taken, the need for sanction did not arise. Rohatgi, however, maintained that this interpretation conflicted with the statutory requirements of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The Court has now reserved its judgment and will deliver its verdict on this nuanced legal issue in due course.