SPECIAL INTENSIVE REVISION MUST FOLLOW RULES AND TRANSPARENCY; SUPREME COURT TELLS ELECTION COMMISSION:

While hearing challenges to the conduct of Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls across various States, the Supreme Court on Wednesday made it clear that the Election Commission of India (ECI) does not enjoy absolute or unchecked powers under Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950. The Court observed that although the provision allows the Commission to undertake an intensive revision “in such manner as it may think fit,” such discretion must operate within the constitutional framework and adhere to principles of natural justice.

The matter was heard by a Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi. Senior Advocate Rakesh Dwivedi appeared on behalf of the Election Commission. During the hearing, Justice Bagchi questioned whether the ECI could deviate from the existing statutory rules governing revision of electoral rolls, particularly Rule 13 of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. Rule 13 provides the procedural framework for filing claims and objections, including the documentary requirements specified in Form 6.

Justice Bagchi sought clarification on whether the ECI could expand or modify the list of acceptable documents for SIR beyond those enumerated in Form 6. The Court noted that while Form 6 prescribes a limited set of documents relating to proof of birth and residence, the SIR framework introduced by the ECI appeared to require a larger and different set of documents. The Bench questioned whether the Commission could disregard documents recognized under the rules and instead insist only on those newly prescribed for the SIR exercise.

In response, Dwivedi relied on Section 21(2)(a) of the Act, which provides that electoral rolls shall ordinarily be revised in the prescribed manner unless the ECI directs otherwise for reasons to be recorded. He argued that the statute itself contemplates deviations from the rules in special circumstances and that revisions need not invariably follow the statutory rules. According to him, Section 21(3), which begins with a non obstante clause overriding Section 21(2), confers an independent and distinct power on the ECI to conduct special revisions at any time and in any manner it deems appropriate.

However, Justice Bagchi emphasized that even when exercising powers under Section 21(3), the Commission could not disregard the requirement that revisions be conducted in a “prescribed manner,” which is rooted in the statutory rules. Dwivedi countered by stating that the reference to “unless otherwise directed” in Section 21(2) pertained primarily to timelines, and that Section 21(3), by its express language, was not bound by the procedural constraints applicable to ordinary revisions.

The Bench then examined whether the quality and depth of inquiry under Sections 21(2) and 21(3) could differ. Dwivedi submitted that while deviation from prescribed rules under Section 21(2) would be impermissible, the discretionary language of Section 21(3) allowed flexibility in the conduct of SIR. Nevertheless, the Chief Justice observed that even assuming such discretion existed, the procedure adopted by the ECI must still ensure a high degree of transparency, particularly since revisions could have serious consequences on voters’ civil rights.

Dwivedi clarified that the ECI did not claim authority to act arbitrarily or in violation of constitutional norms. He acknowledged that any SIR process must satisfy the requirements of equality, fairness, transparency, ease of access for voters, and conformity with Article 326 of the Constitution. Justice Bagchi reiterated that no statutory power could be entirely unregulated, a position with which Dwivedi expressly agreed.

The Chief Justice further noted that although Section 21(3) does not use the word “prescribed,” unlike other sub-sections, the requirement of conducting the revision in a “manner” necessarily implies adherence to principles of natural justice and transparency. The Bench indicated that discretion under Section 21(3) must be exercised within well-established constitutional limits. The matter is scheduled to be heard further at 2 PM on the following day.