The Supreme Court has recently held that
once a complainant acknowledges receipt of the entire settlement amount by
signing a compromise deed, a conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) cannot be sustained. The Court accordingly set
aside an order of the High Court that had refused to alter the conviction of
the accused, despite a subsequent settlement having been reached between the
parties.
The case arose after the accused had been
convicted under Section 138 of the NI Act for dishonour of a cheque. His
conviction was upheld in appeal and later in revision by the High Court.
Following the dismissal of his revision petition, the accused filed an
application before the High Court seeking modification of the conviction order
on the basis of a compromise deed subsequently entered into with the
complainant. Under the deed, the complainant had accepted payment in full and
final settlement of the defaulted sum. However, the High Court rejected the
application on the ground of non-maintainability.
Aggrieved, the accused approached the
Supreme Court. A Bench comprising Justices Aravind Kumar and Sandeep Mehta
heard the matter, which revolved around the issue of whether the offence under
Section 138 could be compounded after the conviction had already attained
finality, provided the parties voluntarily entered into a settlement.
The Court observed that once the
complainant had, of his own free will and without coercion, signed a compromise
deed accepting the entire amount in full and final settlement, the continuation
of proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act would be futile. In such
circumstances, the concurrent findings of conviction rendered by the lower
courts could not stand and were liable to be set aside.
In support of its reasoning, the Supreme
Court relied upon the precedent laid down in *M/s. Gimpex Private Limited v.
Manoj Goel* (2021). In that case, it had been held that when parties
voluntarily enter into a settlement and agree to abide by its terms, they
cannot subsequently seek to reverse its effects by pursuing both the original
complaint and a subsequent complaint arising out of non-compliance with the
settlement. The Court emphasised that the principle equally applies in cases
where the accused has already been convicted, provided that the complainant has
acknowledged settlement in unequivocal terms.
The Bench also drew attention to Section
147 of the NI Act, which makes offences under the Act compoundable in nature.
It underscored that the object of introducing this provision was to promote
settlement and resolution of cheque dishonour disputes rather than perpetuating
criminal proceedings where the parties themselves have resolved the matter. The
compounding of offences, being a beneficial provision, must be given full
effect in cases where both parties have mutually settled their disputes.
Considering that the complainant had
voluntarily accepted the settlement amount in full satisfaction of his claim,
the Court held that the conviction under Section 138 NI Act was unsustainable.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s
refusal to alter the conviction, and acquitted the appellant-accused.
This decision reinforces the principle that
in cheque dishonour cases, the settlement between the complainant and accused
takes precedence, and once a compromise is validly entered into, criminal
proceedings lose their purpose.