The Supreme Court of India has
strongly disapproved the practice adopted by some High Courts of granting
interim protection after declining to entertain writ petitions on the ground
that an effective alternative remedy is available. The Court described such an
approach as internally inconsistent and contrary to established principles
governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction. According to the Supreme Court,
once a High Court consciously refuses to entertain a writ petition, the
proceedings must come to a complete end, leaving no scope for the grant of
interim relief in favour of the petitioner.
These observations were made by a Bench comprising
Justice
Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma
while hearing a matter arising from an order passed by the Bombay High
Court. In that case, the High Court had declined to entertain a
writ petition on the ground that the petitioner had an efficacious alternative
remedy available under law. However, despite refusing to exercise its writ
jurisdiction, the High Court proceeded to grant an interim stay on the impugned
order, with the stated intention of enabling the petitioner to approach the
appropriate alternate forum.
The Supreme Court found this course of
action to be legally untenable. It emphasized that the power to grant interim
relief is inherently ancillary to the power to grant final relief. When a High
Court, after due application of mind, chooses not to entertain a writ petition
in the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction, particularly on the ground
that an alternative remedy has not been exhausted, the writ proceedings cease
to survive. In such circumstances, no substantive relief can be granted on the
petition, and therefore, the question of granting interim protection does not
arise. Any interim order passed after declining jurisdiction would amount to
judicial overreach and would undermine the very rationale for relegating the
petitioner to an alternate forum.
The Bench further underscored that
granting interim relief in such situations defeats judicial discipline and
creates an anomalous situation where a court that has declined to adjudicate on
merits nonetheless restrains the operation of the very order it has refused to
examine. This, the Court explained, allows the petitioner to indirectly obtain
the benefit of writ jurisdiction despite the court’s express refusal to
exercise it. Such a practice dilutes the settled doctrine that writ
jurisdiction is discretionary and should ordinarily not be invoked when an
efficacious statutory remedy is available.
In support of its reasoning, the Supreme
Court relied on a binding Constitution Bench decision rendered in State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal
Rungta (AIR 1952 SC 12).
That decision clearly lays down that interim relief cannot be granted
independently of, or in the absence of, the court’s power to grant final
relief. Any interim order passed when the main proceedings themselves are not
maintainable is impermissible in law. The Bench observed that interim
protection, whether in the form of a stay or a direction to maintain status
quo, cannot survive once the writ petition is declined at the threshold.
Concluding the matter, the Supreme Court
expressed its expectation that High Courts across the country would take due
note of these binding principles and strictly adhere to them. The Court
conveyed its hope that such legally inconsistent orders would not recur in the
future, thereby reinforcing uniformity, discipline, and constitutional
propriety in the exercise of writ jurisdiction.