In a significant ruling concerning
electricity distribution, the Supreme Court recently held that Electricity
Regulatory Commissions (ERCs) cannot entertain petitions solely on the ground
of public interest. The Court clarified that while ERCs must consider public
interest in specific matters mandated under the Electricity Act, such as tariff
determination, power procurement, and utility or licensee management, this does
not extend to adjudicating general disputes merely raised in the name of public
welfare.
A bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R.
Mahadevan observed that although the Uttar Pradesh Electricity Regulatory
Commission (UPERC) had jurisdiction under Section 128 of the Electricity Act to
entertain a petition seeking investigation, this does not mean ERCs can
independently take up issues only because they appear to be in the public
interest. The bench emphasized that ERCs derive their powers strictly from the
statute and cannot act beyond the functions explicitly conferred upon them by
the 2003 Act.
The case stemmed from a petition filed by
Respondent No. 4 before the UPERC, challenging a Distribution Franchisee
Agreement (DFA) executed between the appellant (a distribution franchisee) and
Respondent No. 3 (a distribution licensee) for electricity distribution in
Agra’s urban area. The petitioner alleged that this agreement had been entered
into without prior approval from the UPERC and requested an investigation into
the conduct of Respondents No. 2 and 3.
The appellant objected to the petition on
grounds of maintainability and jurisdiction. However, the UPERC admitted the
petition, stating it was maintainable in public interest and warranted an
investigation into the franchise arrangement. The Commission justified its
stance by asserting its authority to assess whether such franchisee
arrangements benefited distribution companies (DISCOMs) and the general public.
Dissatisfied with the order, the appellant
approached the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL), which held that
while public interest litigation is not maintainable before ERCs, the petition
itself was not based on public interest and hence was maintainable. APTEL also
ruled that ERCs can exercise regulatory oversight on distribution licensees.
The appellant then challenged this ruling before the Supreme Court.
On examining the issues, the Supreme Court
first addressed whether an individual could invoke ERC jurisdiction purely
based on public interest. It noted that State ERCs have broader jurisdiction
under Section 86 compared to the Central ERC, but this still does not extend to
consumer disputes or grievances, even if presented as public interest matters.
Importantly, the Court distinguished that the current case did not involve
Section 86, but rather Section 128, which allows for investigations only when a
licensee breaches license terms or the Act itself.
The Court held that Respondent No. 4 failed
to provide substantial reasons or material to justify such an investigation.
The threshold for ordering an inquiry under Section 128 was not met.
On the second issue, the Court clarified
that ERCs do not have direct regulatory oversight over franchisees. Instead,
their oversight is exercised through regulation of distribution licensees,
including any delegation of functions to franchisees. Franchisees act as
agents, and any violation by them is attributable to the licensee, who remains
the responsible party under law. Hence, investigations under Section 128 can
only be directed at distribution licensees.
The Court further noted that UPERC and
APTEL had overstepped their bounds by effectively micromanaging the franchisee
arrangement. It concluded by allowing the appellant’s appeal and setting aside
APTEL’s order, thereby nullifying any proceedings or findings of the Expert
Committee constituted by UPERC.