SUPREME COURT HOLDS ARMED FORCES TRIBUNAL HAS JURISDICTION OVER APPEALS FROM ICC FINDINGS UNDER POSH ACT:

The Supreme Court recently held that armed forces personnel aggrieved by the findings and recommendations of an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) constituted under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, is entitled to file an appeal before the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT). In doing so, the Court set aside a contrary view taken by the Delhi High Court and clarified the scope of appellate remedies available under the POSH Act for members of the armed forces.

The judgment was delivered by a Bench comprising Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan. The Court held that when Section 18 of the POSH Act is read together with Section 14 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, it becomes clear that the AFT has jurisdiction to examine appeals challenging ICC reports and recommendations in cases involving service personnel.

The case arose from a complaint of sexual harassment filed against the appellant, an army personnel, following which an Internal Complaints Committee was constituted in accordance with the POSH Act. Upon completion of the inquiry, the ICC submitted a report recommending disciplinary action against the appellant. Acting on these recommendations, the Naval authorities issued a show cause notice dated March 5, 2025, under Regulation 216 of the Navy Regulations read with Section 15(2) of the Navy Act, 1957, proposing termination of the appellant’s services.

Aggrieved by both the ICC proceedings and the consequential show cause notice, the appellant approached the Armed Forces Tribunal by filing an Original Application seeking quashing of the ICC report and the proposed disciplinary action. However, by an order dated May 30, 2025, the AFT declined to interfere, observing that it would be inappropriate to intervene at the stage of issuance of a show cause notice and that the appellant should first submit his response before the disciplinary authority.

The appellant then challenged the AFT’s order before the Delhi High Court. By its judgment dated July 10, 2025, the High Court dismissed the writ petition, endorsing the AFT’s reasoning. Significantly, the High Court further held that the appellant had no statutory right of appeal under Section 18 of the POSH Act against the findings of the ICC, a conclusion that formed the central issue before the Supreme Court.

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court had committed a manifest error in denying the availability of an appellate remedy under Section 18 of the POSH Act. The Court noted that Section 18 explicitly provides a right to appeal against the recommendations of the ICC before a “court or tribunal” in accordance with the applicable service rules. In the case of armed forces personnel, such appellate jurisdiction is vested in the Armed Forces Tribunal under Section 14 of the AFT Act.

The Bench observed that the Tribunal had failed to consider the appellant’s challenge in its proper statutory context and had not examined the correctness of the ICC report and recommendations as required under law. The Court clarified that the appellant had rightly approached the AFT and that the Tribunal ought to have adjudicated the matter as an appeal under Section 18 of the POSH Act rather than declining interference solely on the ground that a show cause notice had been issued.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the orders passed by both the Armed Forces Tribunal and the Delhi High Court. The matter was remanded to the AFT with a direction to treat the appellant’s Original Application as an appeal under Section 18 of the POSH Act and decide it afresh in accordance with law. With these directions, the appeal was allowed.