On July 17, the Supreme Court clarified
that Section 32B of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
(NDPS Act), which lists factors to be considered for imposing a sentence above
the minimum prescribed punishment, does not act as a restriction on the trial
court’s discretion to award a higher sentence. The Court held that even in the
absence of the specific aggravating factors listed under Section 32B(a) to (f),
a trial court can still impose a sentence beyond the statutory minimum, depending
on the facts and circumstances of the case.
The case arose from the conviction of the
Appellant and another accused under Section 21(c) of the NDPS Act by the
Special Judge (NDPS) for possession of 236 vials of various cough syrups
containing Codeine Phosphate—a psychotropic substance regulated under the Act.
The trial court sentenced the Appellant to 12 years of rigorous imprisonment
and imposed a fine of Rs.1,00,000.
On appeal, the Chhattisgarh High Court
upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to the statutory minimum of 10
years. The High Court relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rafiq Qureshi v.
Narcotic Control Bureau Eastern Zonal Unit (2019), and held that in the absence
of the aggravating factors mentioned in Section 32B, the trial court could not
have imposed a punishment exceeding the minimum threshold.
Challenging this decision, the Appellant
approached the Supreme Court through Advocate-on-Record Ashish Pandey. The main
contention raised was that the entire seizure process was vitiated due to
procedural irregularities. However, the bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala
and Justice R. Mahadevan dismissed the Special Leave Petition, stating that
there was no sufficient ground to interfere with the conviction or the
sentencing.
However, the Supreme Court took the
opportunity to correct what it considered a misinterpretation of Section 32B by
the High Court. It clarified that Section 32B does not impose a mandatory
condition that the listed factors must be present for the court to impose a
sentence above the statutory minimum. Rather, the provision is illustrative and
enables the court to consider these factors in addition to any other relevant
considerations.
The bench observed that the High Court’s
understanding of Section 32B was flawed. It emphasized that Section 32B merely
enumerates factors that may be considered, not that must
be present. A trial court, therefore, is not precluded from imposing a higher
sentence if it finds other relevant grounds, such as the quantity or nature of
the contraband, or the background and antecedents of the accused, sufficient to
justify such a sentence.
The Court noted that the decision in Rafiq
Qureshi had been misconstrued. In that case, the Supreme Court had actually
recognized that the language of Section 32B inherently leaves room for judicial
discretion to consider factors beyond those listed in clauses (a) to (f). Specifically,
Rafiq Qureshi held that the quantity of the contraband alone could be a
sufficient basis for awarding a sentence above the statutory minimum.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court reiterated
that trial courts retain full discretion under the NDPS Act to impose sentences
exceeding the statutory minimum when justified by the circumstances of the
case. Section 32B serves as a guide—not a constraint—on this judicial function.